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1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The employment and labour market situation in Iraq has remained extremely
precarious. Data from different sources covering the period from 2004 to the end
of 2006 suggests that as many as 1.3 to 2 of the 7 million-strong labour force
were unemployed. Unemployment among the young (15-24 years), at around
30 per cent, has been nearly double the overall unemployment rate. An analysis
of the employment generating impact of the reconstruction effort during these
years suggests that against these high levels of unemployment and high growth
of the labour force, it did not contribute sufficiently to improving the situation. 
This book 1 focuses on the critical role of employment and creation of decent
work in facilitating peace in Iraq. It argues that reducing the high degree of
unemployment could contribute to peace and stability in the lives of people,
communities and the country. Iraq’s difficult transition process is compounded
because of the problematic labour market situation which continues to be a
source of grievance and social unrest. Unemployment, especially amongst the
young and dislocated workers, feeds the conflict cycle, and in consequence fur-
ther hampers reconstruction, investment and the creation of jobs. 
This book is based on an analysis of the labour market situation and outlines a
set of policy measures needed – as far as security conditions allow – first to
1 A major part of the work on this book was undertaken for the International Employment
Conference on “Jobs for the Future of Iraq”, held in Amman in December 2004 with further ana-
lytical work conducted in 2005 and 2006. Some recent data on unemployment was added to the
study in early 2007. The 2004 International Conference was organized and led technically by the
ILO within the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Trust Fund for Iraq. The Conference
brought together 145 national and international participants. The Government of Iraq was repre-
sented by the Minister of Labour and Planning and by more than 70 representatives from ten min-
istries and the Central Bank. The Conference was also attended by representatives of Iraq’s employ-
ers’ and workers’ organizations, representatives of local authorities, and leading academics and
experts. On the international front, all major United Nations agencies involved in the reconstruc-
tion of the country were present, as were the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
and key international donors (DFID, UK; USAID, USA; JICA, Japan; and the EC). Representa-
tives from main donor countries were also present.
tackle the immediate problem of a very high level of unemployment and then to
ensure that economic growth leads to productive, remunerative and decent
employment. This requires that the ongoing reconstruction programme create
the greatest number of jobs possible. In the medium and long run the goal should
be the setting up of a well functioning, efficient, equitable and rights-based
labour market which will ensure that the economy moves towards and maintains
a high level of employment and creation of decent jobs.
The book also argues that careful consideration should be given to the sequenc-
ing of reforms and to put in place appropriate safety nets and an affordable
system of social protection. The employment consequences of reform need to be
considered in the wider context of tackling massive unemployment. In the
medium term, the reform process must be developed in a way that leads to more
and better employment opportunities in the private sector. 
Amid an increasingly complex security situation, unemployment and precarious
work in Iraq are central issues. Beyond the need to restore security and the
enforcement of law, proactive interventions and policies for job creation must be
part of an integrated strategy for peace and recovery. The problems of violence,
lack of development and unemployment are closely intertwined. Failure to address
employment and labour market issues in the present crisis would endanger both
security and development. Therefore they need to be addressed concurrently to
ensure that all citizens and communities have a stake in rebuilding the country. 
Within data and other limitations, this book presents key characteristics of the
labour market and employment situation and an analysis of the job generating
impact of the reconstruction and aid programmes. It identifies critical issues to
secure jobs and livelihoods in Iraq. These include the need for active labour
market policies, developing strong labour market institutions and creating con-
ditions for the development of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. It
also addresses some overarching issues relevant to Iraq’s transition, in particu-
lar the challenges of setting up an affordable social protection system and the
sequencing of reforms of State-owned enterprises in a manner that minimizes
negative impact while ensuring growth of a vibrant private sector. 
Giving priority to these areas could contribute to developing sound and sustain-
able mechanisms for productive and decent employment, even if in a limited
way in the present unsettled conditions, but certainly when the security condi-
tions allow them to be fully implemented.
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EMPLOYMENT AND DECENT WORK STRATEGY: 
MAIN POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The main policy recommendations that emerge from the study are part of an inte-
grated employment and decent work strategy whose  aim is not to create just any
employment but Decent Work in which fundamental principles and rights at
work are fully respected, which provide productive and adequately remunera-
tive employment, there is an affordable degree of social protection and adequate
opportunity for social dialogue between the government, employers’ and
workers’ organizations. In this context the main policy recommendations from
the study are as follows:
• Increasing the employment intensity of the reconstruction effort through
appropriate choice of techniques and the reorientation of project choices
and increased implementation towards local and municipal level activities;
• Adopting a macroeconomic framework which encourages domestic invest-
ment, enterprise creation and growth of employment generating sectors
through appropriate incentives;
• Investing in skills development and developing a demand-driven training
system in order to develop a competitive and diversified economy;
• Strengthening labour market institutions, including workers’ and employ-
ers’ organizations, and practices which, when functioning effectively, will
make the path to raising employment levels smoother and address the
social dimension of economic reform;
• Making decent employment explicit in the national development strategy
and developing the institutional capacity to monitor labour market devel-
opments and propose appropriate policy responses; 
• Strengthening the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises through
reform of the policy and regulatory environment, provision of business
development services and microfinance, promoting entrepreneurship
among youth, encouraging economic empowerment of women and linking
large and medium-sized enterprises;
• Reconstructing of the social security system in the context of transition;
• Seeking the views and support of independent organizations of employers
and workers in the formulation and pursuit of employment policy;
• Cooperating with women's organizations in order to promote equal
employment opportunities and conditions without any discrimination;
• Preparing the economy to adapt to structural change and absorb new tech-
nologies and global competitiveness.
Introduction
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4INTERNATIONAL COMPACT WITH IRAQ
A recent development has been the signing in May 2007 of “The International
Compact with Iraq” between the Government of Iraq, the United Nations and
the World Bank. 2 The Compact is a five-year national plan that includes bench-
marks and mutual commitments from both Iraq and the international commu-
nity with the aim of helping Iraq on the path towards peace, sound governance
and economic reconstruction.
The Compact includes a set of economic and social policy benchmarks
including in the medium term reducing unemployment by half, doubling the
non-agricultural labour force participation of women, developing a multi-pillar
social insurance scheme in order to protect the most vulnerable from disloca-
tions caused by economic and political change and the development of an action
plan for investment and economic recovery. 
It is hoped that the analysis undertaken in this study and the policy con-
clusions and recommendations based on an analysis of the labour market in Iraq
will strengthen the contribution that the United Nations System “Delivering as
One” can make towards realizing the goals and benchmarks that have been out-
lined in the Compact. The “Toolkit for Mainstreaming Employment and Decent
Work” recently adopted in April 2007 by the UN system Chief Executives 
Board for Coordination can also serve as an important tool for realizing 
this goal. 3
2 See the Government of Iraq, United Nations and the World Bank, 2007.
3 See United Nations, Chief Executives Board for Coordination, 2007.
CHAPTER 2. EMPLOYMENT SITUATION
LABOUR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT: 
THE BENCHMARK
This section provides a picture of the labour force, employment and its distri-
bution among major activities and sectors using the benchmark year of 2004.
The basic source of information is the Iraq Living Conditions Survey (ILCS),
implemented in 2004 by the Iraqi Central Organization for Statistics and Infor-
mation Technology (COSIT) in cooperation with the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) and the Norwegian Fafo Institute for Applied Inter-
national Studies 4. This is supplemented with the results of the Labour Force
Survey (LFS) conducted by COSIT in two phases – the first in September 2003
and the second in July 2004 5 and with some unpublished data from the same
source for November-December 2006. Estimates of population size in this sec-
tion are based on the ILO dataset, which shows a higher aggregate population
for Iraq than the ILCS. 6
The picture put together in the following tables is not claimed to be anything
more than a possible state of affairs concerning the labour force, employment
and its distribution in Iraq during 2004 and 2006. The reality may have differed
from this scenario in significant ways and some of those possibilities are raised in
5
4 See United Nations Development Programme, Iraq Living Conditions Survey, 2004, Vol-
umes I and II, Baghdad, 2005.
5 The ILO dataset uses the estimates in the United Nations Demographic Yearbook and
applies them to the ILCS. At the time the ILCS data were being processed, the UN estimates were
not available. The UN estimates of aggregate population are about 3.4 per cent higher than the
COSIT estimates. They are also higher than the estimates implied by World Bank’s figure shown
in World Development Indicators 2005. This paper uses the UN estimates simply to ensure consis-
tency with the other papers in this ILO-sponsored project, which uses the UN data.
6 This, however, makes little real difference to actual employment and unemployment esti-
mates, because the working age population – those 15 years old and above – are almost identical
from the two sources.
the discussion below. Given the available information, however, this appears to
be not only a possible, but also a plausible scenario.
Table 2.1 presents the broad aggregates about population, labour force and
employment in 2004. Labour force is usually defined as consisting of those who
are 15 or above and either working or looking for work 7. To this is added those
among 15+ age groups who responded to the ILCS (2004) by stating that they
were not looking for work, because they believed that there was no work avail-
able. These are the so-called “discouraged workers” who have “withdrawn”
from the labour force, because they do not expect to find employment. Econo-
mists however have long argued that they should actually be included as mem-
bers of the labour force. In Iraq’s case, this argument is strengthened by the
unusually low participation rate even after their inclusion, an issue to which we
return below.
Table 2.1: Population, labour force, employment and unemployment in Iraq: 2004
(Absolute numbers in thousands)
Total Male Female
Population 28,057 14,207 13,850
Working-age population (15+) 16,447 8,295 8,152
Economically active & looking for employment 6,735 5,613 1,122
Discouraged workers 649 481 168
Total labour force 7,384 6,094 1,290
Participation rate 8 (%) 44.9 73.5 15.8
Employment 6,015 5,037 978
Unemployment rate 9 (%) 18.5 17.3 24.2
Dependency ratio 10 2.8
Source: Population and working-age population are from the ILO database. All other estimates are based on the Iraq Living Condi-
tions Survey (2004) data.
Note that the labour force, as a proportion of the population, is extremely small.
In other words, the dependency ratio, i.e. the number of individuals supported
by a member of the labour force, is exceedingly high – 2.8 – not counting the
Jobs for Iraq: An employment and decent work strategy
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7 Note that no maximum cut-off age, e.g. 65, has been used. The ILCS (2004) has not done
so and this section could not have applied such a cut-off age for sectoral employment. There is little
evidence that such a cut-off age applies in reality and, even if it did, the error due to its neglect is
likely to be small, because the proportion of the population 65 years old and above is low – less
than 3 per cent.
8 Participation rate is total labour force as a percentage of working-age population.
9 Unemployment rate is the number of unemployed (the difference between total labour
force and the employed) as percentage of total labour force.
10 The dependency ratio is the number of dependents per member of the labour force not
counting the worker him/herself, i.e. the population divided by the labour force minus one.
worker him/herself. The average ratio for all the Low-Income Countries (LIC),
according to the World Bank classification, is 1.22, and for the Middle East and
North African (MENA) countries 1.79. 11 This means that even if all the mem-
bers of the labour force, including the discouraged workers, were fully
employed, Iraq’s economy would be under the debilitating burden of each
worker having to provide for the livelihood of another 2.8 non-workers, which,
under similar assumptions, is 130 per cent higher than the burden that would be
carried by a worker in an average LIC and 56 per cent higher than the burden
carried by a worker in a MENA country.
This disadvantage for Iraq is due to two reasons: an age-structure heavily
skewed in favour of the young and a low ratio of labour force to working-age
population. The former phenomenon is a general feature of the LIC countries
and the MENA region; but it is worse in Iraq. According to UN data, the pro-
portion of the population below 15 years old was more than 41 per cent in Iraq
in 2004. According to the World Development Indicators, the average in 2003
was much smaller: 36.9 per cent in the LIC countries, 34.6 per cent in the MENA
countries, and 29.5 per cent in neighbouring Iran (World Bank, 2005) 12. Among
the factors that led to this unfavourable age structure in Iraq are the high birth
rate and the high mortality rate for the young in recent wars, especially the Iraq-
Iran war of the 1980s (see Annex A). Perhaps the high fertility rate has been the
decisive factor. Both Iraq and Iran had high youth mortality throughout the
1980s, but the age structure for Iran suffers from far less of an imbalance and
the principal difference between the two countries that seems to explain this phe-
nomenon, is the difference in birth rate: 18 per thousand in Iran as compared to
29 per thousand in Iraq 13. 
Skewed age structure is not the only reason for the low ratio of labour force to
population. Labour force, as a proportion of working-age population, is also low:
just 73.5 per cent for men and 15.8 per cent for women. The following table pres-
ents this data for Iraq and for some comparators. 
Table 2.2: Labour force participation rate (percentages)
Male Female
Low-Income Countries 86.3 54.6
Middle East & North Africa 80.8 34.5
Iran 80.2 33.8
Iraq 73.5 15.8
Source: World Development Indicators 2005
Employment situation
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11 These figures are estimated from the population and labour force data for these country
groups shown in the World Bank World Development Indicators 2005. 
12 World Development Indicators 2005 reports the figure for Iraq in 2003 as 39.4 per cent.
13 See World Development Indicators 2005.
It is worth noting that the participation rates for Iraq actually include the esti-
mated discouraged workers in the labour force while discouraged workers are
not included in the same for the comparator cases. Even so, the participation
rates are far lower than for the countries that share similar culture and religion.
This is true for both men and women, but strikingly so for the latter. While low
labour demand may be an important factor, it appears that there are very impor-
tant supply-side factors at work too. Civil unrest and insecurity may have caused
women and, to a lesser extent the population in general, to stay at home. Free
food rations may have made such behaviour affordable.
The high unemployment rate has exacerbated the disadvantage due to the high
dependency ratio. Including “discouraged workers”, who did not identify them-
selves as members of the labour force, because no job was available, the unem-
ployment rate is 18.5 per cent.
The official national labour force surveys by COSIT have come up with unem-
ployed rates that are substantially higher. In July 2004 they were estimated at
26.8 per cent (see Table 2.3) but the more recent unpublished data for November-
December 2006 estimates this at 17.6 per cent (16.28 for males and 22.78 for
females) which is nearer the Fafo estimate. The differences between the July
2004 and Fafo estimates are partly explained by the definition used for measur-
ing unemployment (see Annex B) and the sample frame coverage. It is possible
that these were corrected for in the November-December 2006 survey.
Given the unsettled conditions in which the surveys took place, any unem-
ployment estimate would have been tentative. The important thing is that,
even if we take the unemployment rate estimated on the basis of the ILCS data
or the COSIT November-December 2006 survey, it is high by any absolute stan-
dard. In most developing countries the rate of open unemployment, measured
by surveys of households and labour force, is much lower, typically less than 5
per cent. The high open unemployment rate together with the above factors
means that each employed person carried the staggering burden of 3.66 non-
working persons on average in 2004.
Table 2.3: Results of labour force survey (LFS) by COSIT: 2003 and 2004 
(percentages)
LFS LFS
October 2003 July 2004
Labour force participation rate 44.1 48.5
Unemployment rate 28.1 26.8
Male labour force participation rate 73.7 77.4
Male unemployment rate 30.2 29.4
Female labour force participation rate 14.2 17.9
Female unemployment rate 16.0 15.0
Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS) in September 2003 and July 2004 conducted by
the Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT)
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Table 2.4: Unemployment rate by age groups – COSIT November-December 2006 
(percentages)
Age group Male Female Total
15-19 35.90 25.85 33.73
20-24 24.90 37.70 27.64
25-29 16.51 24.28 18.22
30-34 11.77 21.12 13.67
35-39 8.31 17.86 10.29
40-44 7.70 15.61 9.42
45-49 6.84 11.73 7.88
50-54 8.49 9.82 8.75
55-59 8.67 10.69 9.01
60-64 10.77 6.65 10.29
66 + 7.51 39.88 11.88
Total 16.28 22.78 17.64
Source: COSIT (Unpublished data)
Table 2.5: Unemployment rate by region – COSIT November-December 2006
(percentages)
Governorate Male Female Total
Ninva 25.01 40.08 27.48
Sulymania 5.89 32.96 13.75
Kirkuk 6.43 12.92 7.90
Diyalla 17.64 24.17 18.47
Baghdad 14.82 19.61 15.74
Babil 16.85 11.80 15.05
Kerballa 17.14 26.91 18.53
Wassit 7.26 13.66 8.82
Sallah El-deen 20.90 10.09 18.36
Najaf 15.82 32.97 18.90
Qadesya 19.26 22.26 19.89
Muthana 23.13 21.95 22.94
Theqar 24.68 44.42 27.78
Messan 14.49 38.01 17.91
Basrah 11.54 21.01 12.89
Total 16.28 22.78 17.64
Source: COSIT (Unpublished)
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While the open unemployment rate is high, the rate of underemployment,
defined as the proportion of employed workers who would like to work longer
hours, as given by the ILCS (2004) survey is very low, just 3.5 per cent of those
employed. This is quite consistent with the finding in the same survey that the
median hours of work per week are high: 48 for men and 35 for women.
Why is the unemployment rate so high?
How should one interpret these unemployment and underemployment rates? The
rate of open unemployment is high; and the rate of underemployment, measur-
ing the proportion of those who are currently employed looking for additional
hours of work, is very low. These figures are in sharp contrast to the character-
istics of the labour market in a typical developing country where the rate of
unemployment is low and the rate of open underemployment is very high. A
great deal of additional information and analytical research on Iraq’s labour
market is needed to resolve this issue. 
On existing evidence, many of these features in Iraq seem to derive from the pre-
ponderance of formal employment in a highly urbanized labour market in which
the State has been the dominant employer. Compared to a developing country
with similar living standards, a much higher proportion of employment in Iraq
consists of the formally employed, a very high proportion of whom are on the
Government payroll. Government alone provided employment to 30 per cent of
those who have work. Loss of employment in these categories of workers cannot
be hidden in the form of disguised unemployment that predominates elsewhere
in the developing world. 
But then has job loss not been higher in reality than the surveys show? Indeed,
as the ILCS finding shows, the formal loss of jobs due to the war of 2003 and
its aftermath may have been limited. This of course does not mean that 82 per
cent of the labour force in 2004 was productively employed, as the ILCS survey
explains. Most of those employed in the formal sectors, especially those in the
State sector, have probably been engaged in little productive employment: many
enterprises have simply been shut, while others have been operating at a frac-
tion of their capacity. Much of the labour force has probably been sitting idle
much of the time. Despite having full-time jobs as long as they belonged to the
payroll, much of the labour force’s wages and salaries had lost their real value.
No matter how many hours were spent without actually working, they were not
seeking additional hours of work. It is in this sense that the rate of open unem-
ployment in 2004 was 18.5 per cent and the rate of underemployment in 2004
was only 3.5 per cent, as the ILCS survey suggests. Yet the proportion of Iraq’s
potential human power that was the number of productively employed in 2004
was almost certainly quite low, a situation that has changed little since then.
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SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT
According to the ILCS, employment in the mining sector, of which employment
in the oil sector is a part, contributed only 0.4 per cent of total employment in
2004. On this evidence, the sector that produced about three-quarters of total
GDP in 2005 contributed virtually nothing to the nation’s employment.
Much employment is in the “non-traded sectors”. In 2004, commodity produc-
tion in agriculture and manufacturing employed less than a quarter of the popu-
lation. There are, however, incongruities in labour allocation. According to the
ILCS survey, only 17 per cent of employment was in agriculture and this appears
to have changed little over more than a decade (see Table 2.6). Yet, according to
other surveys, agriculture’s share of non-oil GDP appears to have been high in
the past. Thus the share of agriculture in GDP is reported to have been 30.8 per
cent for 2000 by the UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics (2001) 14 and
29.4 per cent for 2003 by COSIT (Annual Statistical Abstract, 2003). According
to estimates from the International Monetary Fund (2005), the share of agricul-
ture was even around 40 per cent in 2003. If anything, the share of agriculture in
non-oil GDP may have risen in the post-war period. It is unlikely for agriculture
to face as much dislocation as non-farm economic activities do during periods of
turbulence. If these figures and assumptions even approximately resemble real-
ity, then labour productivity in Iraq’s agriculture sector would be much higher
than labour productivity in non-agricultural sectors including manufacturing.
Whether this represents yet another special feature of Iraq’s economy or whether
it is a statistical quirk, is for the moment difficult to resolve.
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14 ILO, Employment in Iraq: Outstanding Issues, paper prepared by the ILO for the Con-
ference on Employment in Iraq, Amman, December 2004 (Geneva, November 2004), Table 2.4
quotes these data.
Table 2.6: Sectoral distribution of employment in 2004 (% of total employment)
Agriculture, forestry & fishery 17.0
Manufacturing & mining 7.3
Construction and utilities 10.5
Trade, hotels, restaurants & repair services 21.7
Transport, storage and communications 10.0
Finance and real estate 1.4
Public administration and defence 17.8
Education, health & social work 10.3
Other services 3.8
Source: Iraq Living Conditions Survey, 2004
How much turmoil did the war of 2003, the subsequent occupation and after-
math cause to employment in Iraq? It is not possible to document the extent to
which those who were employed before the war lost jobs and/or moved to new
jobs. The ILCS however provides information about how many of those in
employment in 2004 had lost their previous jobs and/or moved from a previously
held job. Eighty eight per cent of the employees in the public sector, including
local and central Government and Government companies, were employed in
the public sector prior to the war. The proportion is 94 per cent for the employ-
ees of private companies, 68 per cent for cooperative or joint sector, 95 per cent
for family business, 78 per cent for the NGOs and 60 per cent for private house-
hold employment. It is only for the Iraqi army that the proportion was low: only
11 per cent of its members in 2004 were employed by the army prior to the war,
which could be a result of the decision of the occupying powers in 2003 to dis-
charge Iraq’s army of some 400,000 soldiers. It therefore seems that most people
outside the army in 2004 were in the jobs in which they were employed before
the war. The turmoil in terms of formal job loss and involuntary relocation may
have been limited. The decline of the economy appears to have taken place long
before the war of 2003. 16
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15 There are small errors, possible due to rounding
16 Another group most severely affected by post-2003 dislocation were those who lost their
jobs through the “de-Baathification” directive initiated by the occupying powers. According to most
estimates these were about 30,000-40,000. This directive was relaxed in May 2004.
Table 2.7: Employment by type of employer in 200415
Per Cent Total 
(Millions)
Local or central Government 
including Government companies 29.7 1.794
Private companies 49.2 2.974
Cooperative or joint sector 2.9 0.177
Iraqi army 0.7 0.043
Family business 12.2 0.738
NGOs 3.7 0.222
Private households & others 1.7 0.101
Source: Iraq Living Conditions Survey, 2004
PROFILING UNEMPLOYMENT
A clear understanding of who is unemployed has important implications for
designing the policy response to the unemployment problem. It is also vital to
understand that the incidence of unemployment is not equally distributed
throughout Iraqi society, but that it affects some groups much more than others.
The most affected group in 2004 and in November-December 2006 was young
men and women between 15 and 24 years old (Tables 2.8 and 2.4).
Table 2.8: Unemployment rates by age and gender in 2004 
including “discouraged workers” (percentages)
Total Male Female
Total 18.4 17.2 24.0
65+ 17.1 14.7 31.9
55-64 10.0 9.5 12.5
25-54 12.7 11.2 18.8
15-24 33.4 32.1 40.6
Source: Iraq Living Conditions Survey, 2004
The 2004 ILCS data also suggest that statistically the risk of being unemployed
rises with the level of education. Unemployment was as high at 37.2 per cent
among young men with secondary or tertiary education in 2004. For men of the
same age group with no formal education it was at 31.8 per cent. Thus, the prob-
lem of youth unemployment is most pressing among youths who have a formal
education, but whose skills are not in demand in the labour market at present.
Most of the unemployed youths have never worked before and live from family
allowances while looking for a job. The overall situation of youth employment
in 2004 also stands in contrast to the boom years of the 1970s, when the Gov-
ernment engaged in large-scale programmes to get university graduates a job in
the public sector. The long-term implications of this situation are: little on-the-job
training due to the lack of starter-jobs and apprenticeships, a lower rate of
investment in work skills, and a lower build-up of human capital. 
Apart from the problem of youth unemployment, Iraq also faces the problem of
lack of female integration into the labour market. According to the ILCS survey
(2004) and the COSIT November-December 2006 results, women were signif-
icantly more likely to be unemployed than men. Along the lines of the trend
observed for educated men, educated women were also significantly more likely
to be unemployed than men and unemployment was highest among female sec-
ondary school graduates according to the 2004 ILCS survey. This can be
explained by the tendency that less-educated women in Iraq did not usually
consider themselves unemployed when they had no access to remunerative
employment, as they were not actively seeking work. As the prospect of getting
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paid employment was perceived to be very low, they tended to regard themselves
as economically outside the labour force rather than as unemployed. This is dif-
ferent for educated women: since public sector employment is regarded as
respectable for women they also expressed their desire to work. Thus, lack of
employment opportunities for women tends to show up in low labour force
participation rates, whereas lack of opportunities for men shows up in the sta-
tistics as unemployment (Assaad, 2003, p.128). It is thus likely that when more
women will be taking up jobs, the unemployment rate will rise. Nonetheless,
even if allowing for some undercounting of women and any statistical distor-
tions that this may cause, there is little doubt about the presence of a large sec-
tion of women outside the labour force. This, combined with the young demo-
graphic composition of the population, is likely to keep the labour market under
pressure for the foreseeable future. 
EMPLOYMENT, INCOMES, AND POVERTY
Once a middle-income country, Iraq had been slipping into economic decline
prior to the current situation and conflict in the context of the Iran-Iraq war, the
first Gulf war and sanctions. Although there are very scarce data available on the
extent of poverty in the country, it was estimated that in 2004, more than five
million Iraqis lived below the poverty line (assuming a 25 million population). 17
The median hourly wage in Iraq in 2004 was Iraqi Dinars 1,042 (US$0.72) for
women, compared to Iraqi Dinars 694 (US$ 0.48) for men. 18 In September 2004,
the World Food Programme Iraq country office reported that 25 per cent of Iraqi
families were still highly dependent on the monthly food rations. These figures
point towards the scale of Iraq’s poverty problem. However, a word of caution
is required concerning the reliability of income figures. Those working in the
agricultural sector and in the informal economy are especially likely to have
underreported their income. 
Table 2.9 presents some evidence on the regional distribution of income for 2003
and 2004. It displays regional income levels relative to the average national
income in 2003, which is fixed at 100 per cent as a basis for comparison. Look-
ing first at the averages, it can be seen that the North was at 130 per cent. It was
thus 30 per cent above the national average in 2003 and its lead increased
tremendously to 237 per cent in 2004. The relative position of Baghdad also
improved. This would imply that average income levels have been on the rise
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“Social Security and Safety Nets in Iraq: Outstanding Issues”, Paper prepared by the ILO
for the Conference on Jobs for the Future of Iraq, Amman, 12-13 December 2004, Geneva, Decem-
ber 2004, p. 2.
18 Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004, Volume I, Ministry of Planning and Development
Cooperation of Iraq in collaboration with UNDP, Baghdad, 2005, p.104, which suggested that
higher median wages for women could be related to the fact that “primarily women with higher
education have work, thus are paid more”.
since the beginning of 2004, presumably because of the termination of economic
sanctions and reconstruction spending. 
The median figures, however, tell a different story. As Table 2.9 shows, despite
the big increase in average income in the Northern Governorates of Arbil, Dohuk
and Sulaimaniya, the median income in the North bore exactly the same relation
to the national median income in both years. The discrepancy between average
and median income suggests that while the top earners in the North had been
doing especially well since the end of the war, there was less movement for those
in the middle of the income spectrum. As far as equality of income is concerned,
the distribution of incomes has become increasingly dispersed in the North while
being comparatively more equitable in the South. However, the absence of high
earners in a region is not necessarily a sign of economic strength, even if it
makes income distribution more equal. These income differences combined with
the fact that some parts of the country had been more severely touched by the
conflict than others. Although there was also violence in the Kurdish Northern
Governorates of Northern Iraq, its levels were significantly lower then in other
parts of the country. This triggered an increase in labour migration within the
country away from the conflict ridden Central Iraq.
SUMMARY
Some of the important characteristics of the labour market situation in Iraq
between 2004 and 2006 were as follows:
• An extremely high rate of population growth resulting in a very young pop-
ulation leading inevitably to a very high rate of labour force growth (4 per
cent on average between 1994 and 2004) 
• A very high degree of unemployment especially among the young (15-24
years) where unemployment rates were over 30 per cent
• In common with a number of other countries in the region a high degree of
gender disparity in terms of participation rates and employment 
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Table 2.9: Regional dynamics of income distribution in Iraq, 2003-2004
(Percentages, national average in 2003 = 100)
2003 2004
Average Median Average Median
Southern Iraq 95 105 74 107
Baghdad 84 93 102 100
Central Iraq 105 98 69 96
Northern Iraq 130 99 237 99
Source: Iraq Living Conditions Survey, 2004
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• A very low and almost negligible contribution to employment by large and
medium-sized private enterprises
• The State sector accounting for a large share of total employment and vir-
tually monopolizing formal employment
ANNEX TO CHAPTER 2
ANNEX FIGURES 1 AND 2: 
POPULATION AND THE LABOUR FORCE
A. Demographic trends
Figure 1: Total population (in thousands)
Figure 2: Iraq’s population growth rates in comparision (in per cent)
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population
Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision http://esa.un.org/unpp 
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Figure 1 shows how rapidly the population grew between 1950 and 2000, espe-
cially in urban areas. Between 1950 and 1980, growth accelerated; since 1980 it
has slowed down slightly (see Figure 2). This demographic development sug-
gests that Iraq – as most Arab countries – has been undergoing a demographic
transition from high birth rates and high death rates, which characterizes pre-
industrial societies, to the equilibrium of low birth and low death rates found in
advanced industrial societies. Yet, compared to other countries of the region,
Iraq’s demographic transition appears to be in an earlier stage. Fertility, for
example, declined later and in a less pronounced way than in other countries of
the Middle Eastern region. During 1995-2000, an Iraqi woman had an average
of five children, whereas an Iranian woman had only three. Some analysts have
argued that this comparatively high fertility rate can be linked to poverty and
lack of personal security, as poor people tend to generate children to ensure their
livelihood when they are old. 
Since the mid-1960s, population growth for the cohort aged 15 – 24 years has
been higher than overall population growth, producing tremendous pressure on
the Iraqi labour market on the supply side. The Population Division of the UN
estimates that only after the year 2015 will youth population growth slow down
sufficiently to drop under the overall population growth rate. This is also because
expected declines in fertility in the future will be offset by the hoped for
improvements in child and maternal health. Iraq’s demographic structure also
implies a large size of the working age population: as of 2006 Iraq has a work-
ing age population of some 17.5 million, rising by some 500,000 a year, while
there are 12 million below the working age. Overall, those under 24 years of age
represented over 50 per cent of an estimated total population of 29.6 million in
2006. Even under normal circumstances this demographic structure would pose
a significant challenge to the Iraqi labour market. It therefore comes as no sur-
prise that Iraq has had considerable difficulties dealing with it, in the context of
several wars and an embargo regime. 
B. Workforce size and structure
Population growth translates into labour market trends via the labour force par-
ticipation rate, which is therefore critical to the understanding of the employ-
ment situation. The most obvious characteristic of the Iraqi labour force is that
participation rates are low. Taking the estimates from the ILCS survey as a base-
line yields 70.24 per cent labour force participation for men and only 14.07 per
cent for women in 2006. This results in a weighted average score of 42.40 per
cent. The labour force participation of women is thus strikingly low, with the
only exception of women with higher education and those working in agriculture.19
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Annex Figure 3: Actual and projected labour force participation regional comparison
(percentages)
Source: ILO Laboursta Database, Iraq (summary of revised estimates of economically active population in Iraq (2005)
Figure 3 shows the labour force participation rates in regional comparison. These
participation rates have remained remarkably stable over recent decades in Iraq.
In Syria, in contrast, labour force participation has more than doubled since the
1970s and is now at around 60 per cent. The reason for this catch-up is mainly
an increasing participation of young women workers in the labour market. This
has to be seen in the context of changing gender roles with women taking up a
more proactive position in society. In Iraq, on the other hand, the participation
rate has stagnated at very low levels. 
The finding of the ILCS survey that Iraq’s labour force participation has not
increased was in contrast to expectations, as it was assumed for a long time that
female labour force participation was higher in Iraq than in other Arab countries.
It was one of the expressed goals of the Baath Party to promote the emancipa-
tion of women. However, these attempts were offset by the economic pressure,
which held back the absorptive capacity of the labour force, constraining the
social modernization that other Middle Eastern countries have witnessed in
recent decades. If the conditions in Iraq normalize, the female labour force par-
ticipation may increase sharply in line with the experience of other Middle East-
ern Countries in the 1990s. The scope for increasing female participation in the
labour market is immense and will ensure that the pressures on the labour market
will be upheld for some time to come. 
Diverging estimates of the employment situation: 
COSIT 2003 and 2004 and Fafo 2004 
In 2003 and 2004, three different labour market surveys were conducted: the Iraqi
Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT) con-
ducted two Labour Force Surveys (LFS) covering around 25,000 households. In
April 2004, COSIT conducted another survey with technical assistance from the
Norwegian Fafo Institute covering 21,700 households. This second survey was
called the Iraqi Living Conditions Survey (ILCS). It arrived at a quite dissimilar
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conclusion to the LFS estimate. While the LFS estimated the unemployment rate
to be at 26.8 per cent, the ILCS concluded a much lower unemployment rate of
10.5 per cent. Although there may have been some variation in employment due
to seasonal fluctuations, this huge difference cannot be explained by the timing
of the surveys alone. It appears that the large discrepancy is largely a result of
different methods in the definition and assessment of unemployment. The ILCS
survey followed more strictly the ILO conceptualization of unemployment. To
qualify as unemployed under this definition, a woman or man has to be of work-
ing age, must have actively looked for work, and must not have worked for
income or in kind for more than an hour within the reference period of one week.
Thus, only those who have performed no work at all are considered “unem-
ployed”, while the others are considered “underemployed”. Applying this defi-
nition to developing countries usually leads to a small number of unemployed
and a comparatively large number of underemployed persons. 
The Labour Force Survey followed a broader conceptualization of unemploy-
ment that allowed for more working hours per week until a person was called
“employed”. The LFS considered those who had worked less than 15 hours a
week “unemployed”, as opposed to the one-hour-per week cut-off line of the
ILCS. The rationale behind this different cut-off line is that working less than
15 hours is insufficient to make a living in Iraq, as wages are very low. 
Another difference concerns the category of the so-called “discouraged workers”.
These are the people who want a job and are currently available for work but
who have given up searching because they believed that there was no work to
be found. This concept is based on the premise that the discouraged workers are
only temporarily out of the labour market and would be looking for work if there
were jobs on offer. As the discouraged workers act in very similar ways to the
unemployed, they are included in the category of the “unemployed” in the
Labour Force Survey. According to Sletten (2005) the unemployment rate
increases by 8 per cent to 18.5 per cent, if the discouraged workers are included
into the “unemployed” category. If the “discouraged workers” are included and
the cut-off point for “unemployment” is lifted from one hour to 15 hours of work
per week, unemployment rises to 22.5 per cent. The difference of this estimate
to that of 26.8 per cent put forward by the LFS is thus reduced to only 4 per cent.
Sletten (2005) suggests that the remaining four percentage points of difference
between the ILCS and the LFS estimates are due to different structures of the
questionnaires used by the two surveys. 
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CHAPTER 3. RECONSTRUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT
INTRODUCTION
The high levels of unemployment and underemployment in Iraq clearly war-
ranted that high priority be given to job creation in the reconstruction pro-
gramme. Indeed the Government, donors, World Bank and UN agencies identi-
fied employment creation as a major objective of the reconstruction programme.
It was recognized that reducing the high levels of unemployment especially
amongst the young and displaced workers would have a favourable impact on
security and on the law and order situation.
The issue this chapter addresses is whether the high priority which was at least
overtly being given to job creation was actually reflected in the investment pro-
gramme being undertaken as part of the reconstruction effort during 2004 and 2005
by the Government, multilateral institutions, donor countries and UN agencies.
To find an answer to this question the results of two exercises conducted to eval-
uate the employment impact of the reconstruction effort were analysed. The first
was a macro exercise, which analysed the investment undertaken in 2004 and
2005, and then generated estimates of the numbers of jobs that could have
resulted. This was done by examining the available information on estimates of
total investment made in these years, the sectors in which it was concentrated
and the capital and import intensity of this investment. The methodology suffers
from some serious shortcomings including labour-use assumptions based on
other countries’ experiences. It does however provide some interesting insights
on the impact, or lack of it, of the reconstruction effort on the employment and
labour market situation.
The second part of this chapter reports on an exercise that the UN undertook
during the second half of 2004 to evaluate the extent to which its programme in
Iraq reflected sufficiently the high priority it had assigned to the goal of improv-
ing the employment situation. The major aim of this “labour audit” or “labour
assessment” was to take a sample of projects being implemented by UN agen-
cies in Iraq and examine whether this potential for generating employment was
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being fully realized in terms of their labour use and whether there was a possi-
bility of increasing the labour or employment content of these projects either by
using different contractual arrangements or more labour intensive techniques
of production.
The limitations of both these exercises must be kept in mind when interpreting
the results of this analysis. Clearly employment or job creation cannot be the
only priority assigned in designing the reconstruction programme. The revival
of key sectors, for example, oil exports which are vital for revenue generation
must have priority, even if the huge investment this would involve would have
very little direct impact on the domestic economy in terms of linkages with the
rest of the economy or employment generated. Similarly, the clearing of the har-
bour in the south of the country and making the port operational must again be
given high priority even though the machinery needed to do this is highly capi-
tal-intensive and labour employed in the operation minimal.
Also one needs to take into account the security and law and order situation
where the projects were to be implemented. If the security situation were such
that the timeframe for implementation and providing security for those who were
to work on the project needed to be kept to a minimum then clearly this would
have an impact on the way in which the project was designed and implemented.
Again it is difficult to assess the factors which did impact on the choice of proj-
ects and their means of implementation. Clearly the geographical location of the
project played a part in this decision as did many other factors.
The challenge the reconstruction programme faced was twofold: first to select
and implement those projects which would respond to the urgent needs of
rebuilding and restoring vital infrastructure, even if this implies the use of cap-
ital-intensive technology, as these would be vital for regenerating growth and
employment creation in the rest of the economy; second, that those projects, in
which there were possibilities for maximizing the employment impact, bidding
and contractual arrangements including choice of technology, were so framed in
the project design to ensure that such an impact did in fact materialize.
It is the answer to these two challenges that this chapter addresses. But before
we do so we examine some of the key principles that have been identified by the
ILO in designing an employment-intensive reconstruction programme.
PRIORITIZING EMPLOYMENT IN RECONSTRUCTION
Experience from previous post-war reconstruction suggests that employment
must be made one of the central objectives of reconstruction programmes on the
premise that reconstruction needs to fulfil both economic and social objectives.
Its aim must be not only the reconstruction of physically destroyed assets, but
also to address the social needs of the community. Tackling unemployment is
generally recognized as a priority issue in this context.
From this standpoint some key principles for reconstruction emerge. Shone
(2003) describes them as follows: first, the unemployment problem and infra-
Jobs for Iraq: An employment and decent work strategy
22
structure rehabilitation needs must be addressed concurrently. The choice of
technology for undertaking the reconstruction works and the packaging of
reconstruction contracts should be done in a way that secures a fair share of the
market for local enterprises. Through mainstreaming these labour-based recon-
struction techniques, the reconstruction programme itself can become a tool for
addressing unemployment and poverty. Second, the capacity of the local con-
struction sector needs to be enhanced to respond to the business opportunities
arising through reconstruction. Otherwise the weakness of the local business
community can impair its ability to duly participate in the reconstruction
process. This includes providing credits, business support services, training, and
local development strategies. Third, the labour-intensive reconstruction should
also be used to “build peace” on a community level. Doing projects with a vis-
ible impact and significant employment potential can help to diffuse the frus-
tration that nothing is moving. Amid the difficult security context in Iraq it can
be hoped that working towards a common goal will help to foster social cohe-
sion, combat passivity and rifts between communities.
EMPLOYMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE
As is well known, Iraq's economy is dominated by the oil sector, which has tra-
ditionally provided about 95 per cent of foreign exchange earnings and a large
share of State revenue. In the past the Government used some of these earnings
for financing significant investments in the infrastructure. In this respect, Iraq
was a leader in the Arab world in the 1970s. Since then, however, Iraq’s infra-
structure has fallen back to levels comparable with a lower income country. In
the wake of the fall of the Baath regime, Iraq’s infrastructure was in a debilitated
state suffering from decades of underinvestment. Initial advances were made
after 2003, principally in restoring oil production capacity, but reconstruction
has been stalled by the lack of security. Violence, sabotage and crime have ham-
pered reconstruction efforts. According to recent estimates, only 85 per cent of
households have stable access to electricity networks, which only provide some
3 – 6 hours of electricity daily. Only 20 per cent are connected to reliable water
and waste-water infrastructure (World Bank, 2006). Thus further investments
will be necessary and are estimated in the neighbourhood of US$7 billion. Even
under unfavourable conditions, investments of such magnitude are likely to gen-
erate a significant number of jobs. Infrastructure reconstruction is therefore the
main area in which policy choices can have a favourable impact on the employ-
ment situation.
Discussing the link between employment and infrastructure reconstruction one
needs to bear in mind that much of it was donor-funded. In 2003, a conference
of donors in Madrid pledged over US$32 billion in grants and loans. The assis-
tance was composed of two major funds, the multilateral International Recon-
struction Fund Facility for Iraq and a separate fund administered by the US. Of
the latter, US$16.7 billion had been obligated by the time of writing (United
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States Congress, 2006). It appears that there was no plan to systematically pro-
mote Iraqi involvement within the reconstruction programme prior to the
Amman Conference in November 2004. This meant that Iraqi participation was
left to function on its own rather than being the fundamental and agreed upon
principle of all reconstruction efforts. The conditions for realizing the priority
objective of job creation were thus not ideal from the outset. 
Employment impact of investment in 2004-05
In analysing the employment impact of investment made in 2004-05, a large part
of which was donor funded, it needs to be kept in mind that much investment
expenditure inevitably goes on the purchase of machinery and equipment from
abroad for all sectors, including transport equipment and indeed construction
machinery. What one needs to work out in broad terms is what the investment
programme undertaken during 2004 and 2005 would imply in terms of wages,
purchase of materials, equipment rentals and overheads, and activities in Iraq.
The exercise undertaken was broken down into a number of steps. Using IMF
(2005) estimates as the baseline for GDP and investment, the estimated imports
of capital goods were then subtracted from investment undertaken in 2004 and
2005. This showed that the US$12.6 billion public investment programme for
these two years involved around US$4.3 billion to cover activities on the ground,
such as procurement of construction material, and wages. We then analysed
public and private sector separately. For the public sector we used Government
estimates of the sectoral breakdown of public sector investment, and then on
assumptions of labour intensity of these sectors calculated the implied expendi-
ture on wages. We then, on the basis of average wages reported by the UN
Labour Audit Report and the ILCS (2004), calculated the number of workdays
of employment generated. 
Based on these steps and given the breakdown into different activities reported
by the Government for 2004, we find (see Table 3.1) that during the two years
2004 and 2005 this public investment created 53 million working days per year,
or some 200 yearly workdays for 263,000 people. On top of this an additional
50,000 jobs were created in the private sector (See Annex Table 3.1). These fig-
ures need to be seen in the context of almost 250,000 new entrants into the labour
market during 2004 and 2005 due to labour force growth. 20 The net contribution
to reducing the high levels of unemployment was therefore minimal.
While recognizing the limitations of this exercise, although it is based mainly
on plausible assumptions drawn from other countries, the results do clearly point
out that the investment programme as was designed and implemented during
2004 and 2005 was clearly insufficient to overcome or significantly ease the cur-
rent unemployment and labour market situation. 
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20 This is based on data from the ILO Laborsta database, which has been adjusted to the find-
ings of the Iraq Living Conditions Survey. 
Table 3.1: Employment intensity of investment: Public sector
US$ millions 2004 2005 2006**
GDP (Real) 25,724.0 26,855.9 28,037.5
Public investment
Total public investment 5,736.5 6,875.1 7,458.0
Domestically spent investment 
Finance 187.9 225.2 244.3
Internal affairs, security and defence 289.9 347.4 376.9
Transportation and telecommunications 76.1 91.2 99.0
Public works and municipalities 49.8 59.7 64.7
Housing and construction 23.7 28.4 30.8
Industry and mining and planning 18.6 22.2 24.1
Petroleum 514.5 616.6 668.9
Electricity 540.3 647.6 702.5
Health and education 27.0 32.4 35.1
Cross-cutting issues (Labour 
and social affairs, science, youth, migration) 9.6 11.5 12.5
Other 218.0 261.3 283.4
Total 1,955.5 2,343.6 2,542.3
Wage bill 231.6 277.6 301.2
Employment 240,958 284,799 304,679
Source: IMF (2005) and ILO estimates (See Annex Table 3.1) **Projected
EMPLOYMENT ASSESSMENT SURVEY 
While the employment-impact assessment was conducted with the intention of
understanding the overall employment impact of reconstruction efforts, the fol-
lowing employment assessment discusses the necessary prerequisites to raise the
use of labour in reconstruction. It draws on the common experience that for
many construction tasks a choice of techniques can be made that vary in their
mix of expenditure on labour and capital (e.g. equipment rental, interests, or
payments) but provide a similar final product. The assessment is therefore
largely a technical exercise, based on the assumption that more jobs could be
created through Iraq’s reconstruction by means of modifying the technologies
utilized for their implementation. 
The employment-technology assessment draws on data from two levels. Using
standard reported data, the research team first conducted an overall assessment
of selected UN-funded projects; and then complemented this data with case stud-
ies of 11 individual projects covering a wide range of sectors and sources of
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funding. The study was conducted by a staff of Iraqi consultants and government
officials under the guidance of an international specialist for labour-based tech-
nology. The assessment was based on a standard approach developed by the
ILO, which draws on a combination of review of data that projects hand in to
their funding agencies and an on-site appraisal using a standardized checklist.
This approach is deemed sufficient by most experts to provide empirical infor-
mation about the impact of reconstruction programmes on employment.
Table 3.2: Projects reviewed
Project Funding source
Individual projects:
Open Educational College, Baghdad Ministry of Education
Book stores Ministry of Education
National Centre for Health & Vocational Safety MOLSA
MOLSA HQ building MOLSA
Al Sayab Girls’ Secondary School MOLSA
Tequar Primary School MOLSA
Raw water complexes UNICEF
Al-Itifia Raw Water Station UNICEF/US Army
Al-Wathba Raw Water Station UNICEF/Red Cross
Environmental Cleaning Project (Mosul) UNICEF
Environmental Cleaning Project (Al Ramadi) UNICEF
Overall assessments:
Rehabilitation of 26 schools, 10 technical institutes and one university UNHABITAT
Rehabilitation of water/sanitation facilities and public buildings UNDP/Govt. of Japan
Reconstruction and Employment Programme – basic infrastructure repair UNDP – IREP
Rehabilitation of chlorination production facilities UNIDO
Source: UN/ILO Iraq Employment Assessment, 2004
Results of the employment-technology assessment
Project characteristics: The available funding for the sample projects totalled
US$2.4 million, of which US$1.98 million was allocated to civil works and con-
struction related activities. The average project was around US$0.25 million, the
smallest being US$35,110, and the largest over US$1.2 million. Overall, 71 per
cent of the contracts used “standard” or conventional civil works implementa-
tion and around 15 per cent used either machine or labour-based, equipment-
supported technology. The projects were all implemented starting from mid-
2003 to the time of assessment during November 2004, with average contract
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duration of 106 days. In principle the majority of the projects (91 per cent) incor-
porated job creation as part the project design and the contracts used a mixture
of technologies, all using locally-available materials, with a limited use of pre-
fabrication and pre-cast components. Overall, 71 per cent of the contracts used
“standard” civil works implementation methods/technology and around 15 per
cent used either machine or labour-based/intensive technology. The employment
content would be significantly higher if the projects had used a different tech-
nology mix, including labour-based equipment supported methods.
The employment content of the civil works projects (by value) consisted on
average of 7 per cent professional staff, 19 per cent skilled, 33 per cent semi-
skilled, and 41 per cent unskilled. These proportions are similar to those that
would be expected under standard contracting conditions, but they are different
from what would be expected using labour-based methods. Overall, wages
accounted for around 27 per cent of the contract costs, which is again consistent
with the use of standard construction techniques. There was a wide range of
daily wage rates for unskilled labour ranging from US$3 – 7 per day.
Main employment indicators: The sample projects all included civil works,
but other components were also incorporated, such as mechanical/electrical
works (55 per cent of contracts) and equipment and furniture (73 per cent). The
data collected allowed a fairly detailed assessment to be made of the total
employment created by the projects. The average number of workers per con-
tract was 110, over 90 per cent of whom were youths (aged 15-24), 71 per cent
unskilled and 90 per cent fully able-bodied. Very few of the workers were
female. Permanent jobs accounted for 7.5 per cent of total employment. Esti-
mates were also made of indirect employment – accounting for approximately
an additional 20 per cent of the jobs created through the projects, the majority
of which were for services provided before implementation. This result is rather
on the low side compared to experiences from projects elsewhere, but may partly
be due to the sectoral composition of the projects reviewed.
Civil works expenditure: The average civil works expenditure was also analysed,
with labour accounting for 27 per cent on average of contract values,
local/imported materials for some 30 per cent, mechanical equipment and tools for
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Table 3.3: Project characteristics
Project duration (days) 106
Current status (% completed) 94
Job creation considered in project design (%) 91
Technology choice:
– Use of pre-cast/prefab materials (%) 9
– Use of locally made materials (%) 82
– Use of locally available materials (%) 100
Source: ILO, Iraq Employment Assessment, 2004
13 per cent, and overheads/preliminaries and profit for around 31 per cent. These
average values are similar to what would be expected when using “standard” levels
of technology, although the overheads/preliminaries and profit components are
approximately 20 per cent higher than would normally be expected reflecting the
uncertainties and risks involved with construction activities in Iraq at present. 
Project implementation constraints: Questions about the supply of workers
indicated that there was an adequate supply of unskilled workers (91 per cent of
respondents) and some shortages of skilled workers, but the greatest gaps were
in the supply of supervisory staff. The main bottlenecks/constraints in imple-
mentation of the projects were identified as (1) lack of trained staff, (2) lack of
access to credit and (3) lack of material resources. From these results it can be
concluded that training of supervisory staff is one of the main priorities in over-
coming project implementation constraints.
Table 3.5: Training required to improve the qualifications of construction personnel
(percentages)
– Unskilled (male) 64
– Skilled (male) 100
– Supervisory (male) 73
– Professional (male) 36
– Unskilled (female) 18
– Skilled (female) 18
– Supervisory (female) 27
– Professional (female) 36
Source: ILO, Iraq Employment Assessment, 2004
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Table 3.4: Bottlenecks/constraints to implementation procedures
(percentages)
– Lack of local participation in project design 18
– Lack of targeting of special groups 0
– Need for more decentralization 27
– Need for better procurement 9
– Need for faster payments 36
– Lack of small and medium enterprises 18
– Lack of access to credit 64
– Lack of material resources 64
– Lack of trained staff 73
Source: ILO, Iraq Employment Assessment, 2004
All project managers interviewed believed that skilled workers needed addi-
tional training, and 73 per cent of them demanded more training for male super-
visory staff. This result underscores the necessity of additional training for con-
struction personnel. 
Other data allowed a detailed assessment of the total employment impact of
these projects: The average number of workers per contract was 110, over 90 per
cent of whom were youths (aged 15-24), 71 per cent were unskilled, and 90 per
cent fully able-bodied. Very few of the workers were female. Permanent jobs
accounted only for 7.5 per cent of the total employment. 
Key findings: employment assessment
The survey results suggest that the priority that employment should have been
given was not adequately reflected in the way the reconstruction effort was
planned and implemented. Among the many issues that were analysed, three
warrant particular attention: 
First, projects in 2004 were seriously underutilizing labour-based technologies.
Of the projects reviewed 71 per cent were using “standard” or conventional civil
works implementation methods and only 15 per cent labour-based technology.
This finding suggests that there would have been wide scope for increasing the
employment impact of projects by using more labour-based technologies in their
implementation. If the technology mix were changed by adding a conservative
5 per cent of the contract values to be used as wages, the number of jobs would
increase by around 22,600 jobs per billion dollars spent. Also for every job cre-
ated directly using labour based-methods, another 1.6 jobs would be created due
to indirect effects. The most significant group employed in construction activi-
ties consisted of young people in the 15-24 age range.
Second, the assessment also found that Iraqi enterprises operating on a smaller
scale pay more for capital, use it more sparingly, and are thus more labour inten-
sive. In the assessment period there had already been a substantial growth in the
number of contractors (30 per cent overall from mid-2003 to November 2004). 21
This implies that splitting up major construction tasks into elements that could
be handled efficiently by small and medium-sized enterprises would further
stimulate activity in this sector. However, as of 2004, there was still a need to
build up capacities for local contractors and to undertake labour intensive con-
struction projects. Skill shortages were found to be a major constraint to pro-
ductivity – in particular for skilled workers. The survey therefore suggested tech-
nical cooperation to focus on capacity building.
Third, the assessment found donor procurement regulations to be an important
factor in determining the employment impact of projects. In this context it is
Reconstruction and employment
29
21 Prior to April 2003 there were around 23,000 contracting organizations, of which 600 were
construction companies and the balance were individual contractors.
necessary to bear in mind that much of the assistance for Iraq has been provided
through bilateral assistance. While multilateral donors and some bilateral ones
have rather “liberal” rules allowing for local procurement, this practice is less
common among major bilateral donors. While not all donors permit local pro-
curement, some allow for national preferences during bid evaluation. The impact
– or the lack of it – of reconstruction on employment in Iraq emphasizes that
technical assistance should be provided in untied form, wherever possible.
CREATING AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR LABOUR-BASED
RECONSTRUCTION
If the investment programme is currently insufficient to overcome or ease the
current labour market situation the real challenge is to push the reconstruction
programme into a more labour intensive direction. In any case, the potential for
infrastructure investment will remain high during the coming years. Iraq has
made progress in addressing some of these issues: on 30 June 2005, the Gov-
ernment established a tripartite, i.e. including employers’ and workers’ repre-
sentatives, Inter-ministerial Board for Employment Creation, which is headed
by the Ministry of Labour. One of the agenda items of the Board is to evolve a
policy emphasizing labour-based methods and to direct the international support
programme in this regard. 22 Within the UN, new regulations have also been
adopted to mainstream the use of labour-based technologies. These are impor-
tant steps but they are not in themselves sufficient to achieve the required impact.
Indeed, the challenge will be to mainstream labour-based technologies in all sec-
tors where they can be applied. This would involve abandoning the standard
“partition of labour”, which means that some projects specifically focus on
employment creation, while the bulk of projects disregard employment-related
criteria in their project design.
Labour-based policies can provide a framework for the participation of the
domestic economy, but they must also be complemented by capacity building
for small and medium-sized contractors in order to fulfil their catalytic function.
Due to its strong backward linkages into the economy, the construction sector
can help trigger an economic dynamism that will eventually be taken over by the
private sector. But for this to happen, the local economy needs to establish a
“response mechanism” that ensures that private businesses can engage compet-
itively in the reconstruction market. The Government and the donor community
need to address this issue by (a) providing business development services paral-
lel to reconstruction and by providing an opportunity for small enterprises to
invest in the reconstruction market, (b) by providing counselling and informa-
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22 Letter entitled “Establishment of an Employment Committee” (Ref 370) from MOLSA,
dated 12/7/2005 and a letter of approval from the cabinet office dated 30/7/2005.
tion services for small contractors, and (c) by collaborating with financial insti-
tutions to facilitate contractor access to producer loans. The local economic
development approach has frequently been proven suitable to address these
issues in an integrated manner. 
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Annex Table 3.1: Employment intensity of investment
US$ millions 2004 2005 2006**
GDP (Real) 25,724.0 26,855.9 28,037.5
A: Public investment
Total public investment 5,736.5 6,875.1 7,458.0
Domestically spent public investment 1,955.5 2,343.6 2,542.3
Administrative Division
Finance 187.9 225.2 244.3
Internal affairs, security and defence 289.9 347.4 376.9
Transportation and telecommunications 76.1 91.2 99.0
Public works and municipalities 49.8 59.7 64.7
Housing and construction 23.7 28.4 30.8
Industry and mining and planning 18.6 22.2 24.1
Petroleum 514.5 616.6 668.9
Electricity 540.3 647.6 702.5
Health and education 27.0 32.4 35.1
Cross-cutting issues 
(labour and social affairs, science, youth, migration) 9.6 11.5 12.5
Other 218.0 261.3 283.4
Total 1,955.5 2,343.6 2,542.3
Wage bill
Finance (10%) 18.8 22.5 24.4
Internal affairs, security and defence (22%) 63.8 76.4 82.9
US$ millions 2004 2005 2006**
Transportation and telecommunications (15%) 11.4 13.7 14.8
Public works and municipalities (36%) 17.9 21.5 23.3
Housing and construction (37%) 8.8 10.5 11.4
Industry and mining and planning (30%) 5.6 6.7 7.2
Petroleum (5%) 25.7 30.8 33.4
Electricity (5%) 27.0 32.4 35.1
Health and education (40%) 10.8 13.0 14.0
Cross-cutting issues (labour and social affairs, 
science, youth, migration) (27%) 2.6 3.1 3.4*
Other (18%) 39.2 47.0 51.0
Total 231.6 277.6 301.2
Employment
Finance 21,345.0 25,228.7 26,989.7
Internal affairs, security and defence 70,299.1 83,089.8 88,889.8
Transportation and telecommunications 15,222.6 17,992.3 19,248.3
Public works and municipalities 18,872.5 22,306.3 23,863.4
Housing and construction 9,240.9 10,922.3 11,684.7
Industry and mining and planning 5,860.6 6,926.9 7,410.4
Petroleum 20,255.6 23,941.0 25,612.2
Electricity 27,015.5 31,930.9 34,159.8
Health and education 9,390.3 11,098.8 11,873.6
Cross-cutting issues 
(labour and social affairs, science, youth, migration) 2,149.9 2,541.1 2,718.5
Other 41,305.9 48,821.3 52,229.3
Total 240,958.0 284,799.4 304,679.5
B: Private investment
Total private investment 909.2 949.2 990.9
Agriculture (17%) 154.6 161.4 168.5
Manufacturing and construction (25%) 38.6 40.3 42.1
Trade and services (52%) 20.1 21.0 21.9
Other (6%) 1.2 1.3 1.3
Domestic spent investment (Less import of equipment)
Agriculture (45%) 69.6 72.6 75.8
Manufacturing and construction (43%) 16.6 17.3 18.1
Trade and services (50%) 10.0 10.5 10.9
Other 0.5 0.6 0.6
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US$ millions 2004 2005 2006**
Wage bill
Agriculture (20%) 13.9 14.5 15.2
Manufacturing and construction (20%) 3.3 3.5 3.6
Trade and services (20%) 2.0 2.1 2.2
Other (20%) 0.1 0.1 0.1
Men working hours
Agriculture 7,727,975.0 7,925,349.6 8,127,765.2
Manufacturing and construction 791,197.4 811,404.8 832,128.3
Trade and services 873,597.2 895,909.1 918,790.8
Other 43,400.3 44,508.8 45,645.5
Jobs created
Agriculture 38,639.9 39,626.7 40,638.8
Manufacturing and construction 3,956.0 4,057.0 4,160.6
Trade and services 4,368.0 4,479.5 4,594.0
Other 217.0 222.5 228.2
Total
Subtotal private 47,180.8 48,385.9 49,621.6
Grand total public and private 288,138.9 333,185.2 354,301.1
Source: IMF and ILO estimates ** Projected
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Annex Table 3.2: Impact of changing construction technology 
(US$ billions expenditure in jobs)
% Total Average Distribution of Total Workforce
by Value Wage US$ Expenditure Workdays (Number of Jobs)
per Day per Year*
Without change in technology:
Total Construction Budget 1,000,000,000 
% Used for Labour Costs 27%
Labour Costs by Level of Skill: 270,000,000
– Unskilled 41% 4.8 110,207,102 22,873,172 91,493 
– Semi-skilled 33% 17.7 89,595,666 5,054,114 20,216 
– Skilled 19% 21.8 50,569,431 2,317,766 9,271 
– Professional 7% 50.0 19,627,801 392,556 1,570 
Total Employment per US$ 1 Billion 30,637,608 122,550
With change in technology and constant wage rates:
Total Construction Budget 1,000,000,000 
% Used for Labour Costs 32%
Labour Costs by Level of Skill: 320,000,000 
– Unskilled 41% 4.8 130,615,824 27,108,945 108,436 
– Semi-skilled 33% 17.7 106,187,456 5,990,062 23,960 
– Skilled 19% 21.8 59,934,141 2,746,981 10,988 
– Professional 7% 50.0 23,262,579 465,252 1,861 
Total Employment per 1 US$ billion 36,311,239 145,245
Incremental employment for 5% change in labour component 22,695
* Workdays per year per worker 200
Annex to Chapter 3
35

37
CHAPTER 4. LABOUR MARKET POLICIES 
AND INSTITUTIONS
INTRODUCTION
This chapter turns to labour market policies and institutions as another essential
building block of an employment-centred strategy for peace in Iraq. Beyond the
immediate need to reverse the trend of growing insecurity, Iraq’s reconciliation and
recovery process must take a shape that promotes productive employment and decent
work in acceptable conditions. This requires strengthening of labour market institu-
tions, which – when functioning effectively – can make the path to economic recov-
ery smoother and allow shocks to the system to be absorbed at less social cost. Such
institutions and practices are important for the consensual management of change
and for reducing the uncertainty and risk facing workers. They include a realistic and
forward-looking approach to training policies, the implementation of active labour
market policies (ALMPs) 23 and the availability of labour market information. 
The Iraqi Government has been striving to restore labour market institutions
amid extraordinarily difficult circumstances. Steps have been taken in the field
of employment policy development, strengthening vocational training, provid-
ing employment services, and building capacity in key ministries. This has
included the establishment of an inter-ministerial council charged with the
design of effective policies and programmes for employment creation; 24 also the
23 ALMPs support employment creation in two basic ways: directly by job-creation meas-
ures (e.g. public works and enterprise creation, as well as hiring subsidies) and indirectly by
improving employability through training and by ensuring efficient labour exchanges that provide
better labour market information and enhanced job matching (See Auer et al., 2005). They also
target the young and excluded groups including disabled workers. Passive labour market policies
on the other hand, are those in which the benefit recipients are not obliged to participate in job train-
ing or work schemes, but act as “passive” recipients of a certain allowance, even though active job
search is frequently a condition for receiving these benefits.
24 This refers to the Employment Committee established on 30 July 2006 in the wake of the
conference on “Jobs for the Future of Iraq”, December 2004. The Committee involves the various
ministries concerned as well as representatives of employers’ and workers’ organizations. 
revision of the labour law has been initiated. However, as important as these
institutional changes may be, they will not in themselves have a considerable
impact. The implementation of an integrated but pragmatic programme is
needed, as is argued in this chapter. This theme will be discussed under the head-
ings of: active labour market policies, social dialogue and labour regulation.
Given the lack of accessible information on labour market policies, this chapter
starts by putting together a sketchy image of ALMPs in Iraq. 
ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES25
In 2003 the Government initiated a major programme to activate the labour
market; by 2005, 600,000 job-seekers had registered in employment centres and
by March 2007 this figure had increased to 940,000 (see Table 4.1 and 4.2). Many
of those registered have received training. Employment centres operate as a con-
stituent part of the Ministry of Labour under its Employment Department and they
exist in all governorates of Iraq. Their main duties involve recruitment, job search
assistance, vocational counselling, labour market information and outreach. 26
These efforts were made against the background of widespread physical damage
in 2003, difficulties in obtaining material, and shortages of machinery and equip-
ment due to the combined impact of looting, violence and a decade of sanctions.
Table 4.1: Number of registered job seekers and placements 
in the employment centres of MOLSA, March 2007
Governorate Registered Placed Persons placed %
Baghdad 183,787 6,252 3.4
Salah al-Din 51,750 4,043 78.1
Diyala 66,552 6,951 10.5
Kerbala 31,767 9,600 30.2
Najaf 55,096 6,018 10.9
Qadissiya 81,805 26,221 32.1
Wassit ( Kut ) 51,181 12,893 25.2
Muthanna 18,685 2,177 11.7
Missan 59,731 21,992 36.8
Thi-Qar 72,947 49,579 68.0
Basrah 63,274 17,701 28.0
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25 This section is based on Riyadh Hasan M. Ali (2004), “The role of MOLSA in Promoting
Employment in Iraq”, paper presented at the International Employment Conference, December
2004 and subsequent update submitted in 2005.
26 Outreach refers to awareness-raising of the potential benefits of vocational training in the
community.
Table 4.1: (continued)
Governorate Registered Placed Persons placed %
Anbar 17,609 8,592 48.8
Babylon 63,715 7,640 12.0
Ninewa 91,338 16,145 17.7
Erbil 10,449 361,000 34.6
Sulaymaniyah 16,077 716,000 4.5
Tameem 48,576 4,657 9.6
Dahuk 1,278 228,000 17.8
Total 939,041 201,766 21.5
Source: Data collected from Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA)
Table 4.2: Number of registered job seekers and placements 
by MOLSA employment centres 2005
Opened employment Registered Persons placed Persons placed
centres job-seekers in the labour market in the labour market
(thousands) (thousands) (percentage)
Baghdad 120.1 4.9 4
Tikrit 5.2 3.5 67
Baquba 35.6 6.0 17
Kerbala 12.8 9.5 74
Najaf 15.1 6.0 40
Diwaniyah 58.7 26.9 46
Kut 22.5 12.1 54
Muthanna 18.1 2.1 12
Maysan 58.0 21.9 38
Dhi Qar 59.4 49.0 82
Basrah 39.1 11.3 29
Fallujah 7.6 4.0 52
Ramadi 9.3 3.3 35
Babylon 19.0 7.6 40
Ninewa 48.2 16.1 33
Irbil 8.9 0.3 3
Suleimaniyah 14.1 0.6 4
Kirkuk 47.7 4.5 10
Dohuk 0.8 0.2 18
Total 600.2 189.7 32
Source: Data collected from MOLSA
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According to Table 4.1 around 940,000 had registered with an employment
centre as seeking work in March 2007 – an increase of almost 50 per cent com-
pared to the figure in 2005 (Table 4.2). The number of registered job seekers in
2007 is fairly large and represents about 12 per cent of the labour force. Of these
the number of persons who were placed in the labour market or found employ-
ment was around 202,000 or 21.5 per cent of those registered – a decrease of
almost one-third from 2005.
Keeping in mind that the country was and is in great turmoil, one has to acknowl-
edge the resilience of Iraqi official agencies to maintain their operations against
all odds. Clearly, a certain level of trust in the system is a prerequiste for such
high registration rates. Compared to other conflict affected countries – where
public institutions are often too weak to function – the basic institutional frame-
work in Iraq is operational, although much of it needs modernization. Wherever
possible, international assistance should try to build on these available capacities. 
The overall picture must be qualified, however, by noting that there are signifi-
cant regional disparities in the performance of employment services. Table 4.1
indicates that in the Northern and Southern Governorates employment services
were working more effectively than in Central Iraq. In Baghdad, for example,
only a meagre 3 per cent of around 184,000 registered job-seekers found
employment after seeking services of the employment centres. 
Figure 4.1: Educational background of job seekers: 2003-2004
Source: ILO (based on Government-reported data)
Figure 4.1 illustrates how difficult it is for many young people to make the tran-
sition from schooling to work. Those facing greatest difficulty in finding jobs
are essentially graduates and school-dropouts. Of the registered job seekers,
89 per cent are men – reflecting a polarization of labour market behaviour
between women and men (see Chapter 2). Providing training for women to facil-
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itate greater women’s participation in the labour market is therefore a priority
for the Ministry of Labour. 
Vocational training centres are associated to the Ministries of Industry, Labour
and Military Industries, but are also vertically integrated under the auspices of
the Training Department of the Ministry of Labour. Subject areas in these cen-
tres include car mechanics, wiring, plumbing, languages (English), and food
processing.
Table 4.3: Expenditure on active labour market policies (US$ million)
2004 2005
Labour market training and subsidized employment 74.7 58.8
National Employment Services 18.0 4.5
Public works 125.0 --
Total 217.7 63.3
Total as share of GDP 0.8% 0.2%
Source: World Bank, 2005, Social protection in transition: Labour policy, safety nets and pensions 
The expenditure on ALMPs in Iraq was at 0.8 per cent of the GDP in 2004 and
0.2 per cent in 2005 (See Table 4.3). In Latin America, an average of 0.4 per cent
(and in transition countries 0.65 per cent 27) of GDP is spent on ALMPs (Auer et
al., 2005). In the case of Iraq this relatively high expenditure level partly comes
about because of one-time investments, e.g. expenditures to rebuild destroyed
machinery and real estate. 
Iraq’s employment centres and vocational training institutions emerged in the
context of a largely State-controlled economy, but are now putting greater
emphasis on a “facilitative approach”. This means that workers are encouraged
and advised to look for a job in the private sector or helped to become self-
employed, rather than being referred to a State-owned-enterprise. It is increas-
ingly recognized that the State can no longer hold the responsibility for creating
all employment for all citizens. However, one barrier to realizing this vision is
the low income and low job quality of the jobs in the private sector. Often pri-
vate sector jobs do not satisfy the expectations of workers and are therefore
rejected by the young as long as they can afford to do so. Thus, improving labour
market services must go hand in hand with raising living standards for those
working in small enterprises. Training will be a crucial productive link to real-
izing this objective. 
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27 The figure for Latin America refers only to training and employment generation. The
figure for transition countries covers all expenditures related to the labour market policy and is an
average of the expenditures in the following countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovakia, and Ukraine.
However, many of these efforts are ad-hoc and improvised in their character.
At least formally, the vocational training policy introduced by the previous
regime is still in place. The Ministry of Labour is trying to cope with the enor-
mous employment problem using modest means and in an extraordinarily dif-
ficult environment. However, the achievements in this field since 2004 high-
light the potential of what could be done, if adequate institutional capacity was
built up. The ILO provided support to MOLSA during 2003-2006 in strength-
ening its capacity. 
Harnessing opportunities
The extent to which the potential of labour market policies can be tapped will
depend on the progress in restoring the efficiency of the employment service
system and on its ability to respond to short-term challenges. Among the many
issues that need to be adressed the following need special emphasis: 28
Linking labour market policies with reconciliation. Iraq is currently undergo-
ing a phase of social turmoil and change, which inevitably is adversely affect-
ing the lives of a large part of the population. However, for the future of Iraq it
will be critical that all communities have a stake in building and maintaining
peace. It is estimated, for example, that through the discharging of the army in
2003 up to 500,000 men have lost a source of stable income. Many also lost
their jobs owing to large-scale dismissals in the Ministries of Interior and Infor-
mation, and in the military industries. Adopting appropriate employment meas-
ures for these heterogeneous groups, that range from ordinary soldiers to senior
executives of the ministries, poses a difficult challenge. One step the Iraqi Gov-
ernment has taken has been to allow former members of the Baath party to go
back into the civil service, but clearly more measures are required. Proactive
measures such as wage subsidies, training and re-training, microfinance, and
also, to a certain extent, cash for work programmes need to be put in place and,
where operating, strengthened or up-scaled if the security situation allows. For
some of those dismissed, placement in public-sector jobs may seem the only
acceptable form of employment. Thus in recent years, Iraqi authorities have
relied on large-scale hiring for the public sector. In part this reflects relying on
the so-called “traditional social contract” in Iraq. Care must be taken, however,
to balance the widespread desire for public employment with long-term finan-
cial sustainability. There is no doubt that finding an appropriate response to this
issue is challenging and it may involve difficult trade-offs, but the challenge is
one that ought to be faced with carefully thought-through policy responses and
practical programmes.
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28 The ILO will be providing technical support in developing the first three of these areas
starting early 2007 through a donor-funded programme.
Building institutional capacity: As important as the aforementioned immediate
measures may be, the long-term task consists in restoring the capacity of the
national system of employment services and vocational training. Currently the
agenda continues to be dominated by the need to rehabilitate buildings, procure
equipment and develop training materials. Further capacity building is neces-
sary in particular in the area of job matching systems, streamlining registration
procedures, and vocational counselling. The goal must be to better coordinate
the development of employment services in order to move to a more strategic
approach in labour market policy. This effort will have to include training of
vocational trainers and other capacity building interventions. A new unit in the
Ministry of Labour has been set up to combat child labour. This is clearly an
important issue as children are often among the most vulnerable in times of tran-
sition and change. Other groups that need to be specially targeted are those who
are traumatized or disabled as a consequence of violence, widows with children,
and internally-displaced persons.
Moving towards demand driven training systems: There is wide consensus that
vocational training should be demand-driven. That is, skills should respond to
the scarcity in the labour markets. For wage employment and public sector enter-
prises skills demand can be forecast to some extent. However, many persons will
eventually have to find work in the private sector, which is currently not really
being catered for by the vocational training system. Given the large wage and
job quality gap with public sector employment, many workers do not yet see the
private sector as an option that is worth the effort for acquiring special training.
Thus training for the private sector must be accompanied by programmes to
improve the job quality in private enterprises, including micro enterprises.
Unless this is done in an integrated manner, the combination of insufficient train-
ing and lack of product quality can be a vicious circle that keeps private enter-
prises in a low productivity growth trap. More on-the-job training is required.
Many countries have had positive experience with the creation of a steering plat-
form with due participation of social partners – including those that represent
small enterprises – to guide the way towards a demand driven vocational-train-
ing system. This is especially important as globalization is a reality for Iraq and
diversification of the economy has become a strategic need. 
Labour market information: The success of labour market measures rests heav-
ily on the performance of labour market information systems. Only when the
needs of the labour market are surveyed in an adequate manner, and the infor-
mation on skill profiles and expectations is properly recorded, can training and
other measures become effective. Iraq’s service centres already have a database
in place, but much more effort and investment is needed to upgrade it to inter-
national standards. Improving the system could help to develop more precise
labour market information that can be passed on to jobseekers. In the short term,
training should emphasise skills in areas where demand exists, such as con-
struction, information technology, and communications. The existing system
should be geared to meeting the needs of these sectors. In the medium and long
term, it is necessary to conduct targeted surveys (e.g. on youth employment) to
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get labour market information that is currently not easily available. To do this
successfully close inter-ministerial coordination between the Central Organiza-
tion for Statistics and Information Technology in MOLSA will be essential.
Box 4.1 UNDP’s Iraq Reconstruction 
and Employment Programme (IREP)
Building on its previous experiences in post-war areas such as Afghanistan
and the Balkans, and given the employment situation in Iraq, the UNDP
launched IREP with the aim of boosting employment creation through
labour-based projects to be implemented across the country. 
IREP – funded by Japan, the European Community, United Kingdom, Bel-
gium and Denmark – finances projects designed to create short-term
employment to vulnerable groups and increase their participation rate in
all stages of the project. This is to be done by working closely with local
communities, local government departments and local contractors. 
The objectives and strategies of the programme are as follows:
• Create temporary employment for vulnerable groups;
• Increase community participation in project design, planning and
implementation;
• Jump-start rehabilitation and restructuring of key public sector enter-
prises and
• Strengthen national capacity to achieve sound debt management.
According to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, by January
2005, the IREP had benefited over 23,000 unemployed people in the
South of Iraq alone, through the implementation of 168 projects at the
cost of US$4.5 million. By mid-2006, over 4.6 million workdays had
been generated through 869 projects benefiting over 110,000 unem-
ployed people. Such projects have included road repair, garbage collec-
tion, rehabilitation of sewage and sanitation systems and irrigation and
rural development. 
This programme serves as an important bridge between humanitarian acti-
vities and the programme of national reconstruction: it responds to urgent
needs at a community level and can lead to significant and lasting changes
in living conditions, whilst simultaneously reinforcing the ability of local
administrations and communities to work together for positive change in
overall living conditions.
Source: http://www.iq.undp.org/economy.html
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EMPLOYABILITY AND SKILLS ENHANCEMENT
Vocational education
Vocational education in Iraq is considered part of the system of secondary edu-
cation. It has existed since the early 20th century, but it was only made a primary
policy objective after the Baath Party came into power in 1968. The educational
policy currently applied is set by the Free Education Law (1974), which guar-
antees State coverage of the costs of three years of vocational training as one of
the three possible tracks of secondary education (See Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4: Vocational training in secondary education: 2004 
(percentages)
Secondary school enrolment by school type (16-18 year olds) Male Female
Vocational education 7.9 1.9
Towards 6th grade baccalaureate 37.9 28.5
Teacher training 3.1 4.6
Non attendees 61.8 73.1
Source: ILO (based on Government-reported data)
After completion of primary and intermediate school, students have the option
to take three years of vocational education. The best 10 per cent of these students
have an additional option to extend this education through another two years at
a technical college. Out of all boys and girls in the 16-18 age group, only 7.9 per
cent of boys and 1.9 per cent of girls pursue this option. The reason for this low
percentage is the high drop-out rate: 61.8 per cent of all boys and 73.1 per cent
of all girls leave school and join the labour force before the age of 19; 37.9 per
cent of the boys and 28.5 of the girls pursue further studies at a secondary school
leading to a baccalaureate. 29
Figure 4.2 shows that the enrolment in vocational education has gone down
since 1994. This is especially true for industrial and commercial schools. There
has been an upward trend since 2003.
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29 ILO, Iraq’s statistical abstracts, 2004.
Figure 4.2: Enrolment in vocational education in Iraq by subject area
Source: ILO, Iraq Statistical Abstracts 2004. Note that services were interrupted 
during 2003, but have been resumed since then. The year 2003 is omitted.
Education system
Seen in a broader context, the education system in general is also critical to the
question of employment policies. The ILO’s Human Resources Development
Recommendation, 2004 (No. 195) concerning education, training and lifelong
learning 30 stresses the interconnectedness of the skill base of the labour market
and the performance of the education system in general. In Iraq, there exists a
severe problem that has to do with the poor employability of secondary school
graduates in the workforce. It is, for example, more likely for a person who has
finished secondary education to become unemployed than for those who have
dropped out earlier. This is the exact reverse of the experience in the OECD
countries, where workers who have finished secondary education are seldom
unemployed compared to those with little education. 
Prior to 1991, the education system was at the heart of government development
plans, with emphasis on higher education and vocational training. Higher edu-
cation – especially in the scientific and technological fields – was of an interna-
tional standard. Traditionally, the number of qualified workers, scientists, engi-
neers, and administrators has therefore been among the highest in the Middle
East. Over the past two decades, general and vocational education have greatly
deteriorated as we shall see next – and not all of this was because of the sanc-
tions, since these started only in 1996.
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30 See ILO (2003), Learning and Training for Work in the Knowledge Society, Geneva.
Education is provided by the State free of charge. While primary education (ages
6 to 12) is compulsory, secondary education (ages 12 to 18) is widely available.
The latter consists of three years at an intermediary school followed by either
three years of secondary school preparing for university, or three years of voca-
tional training preparing for a technical career, or five years at a specially des-
ignated school to become a teacher. 
Table 4.5: Education and literacy in Iraq in regional perspective
Countries and territories Adult literacy rate Primary school % of Secondary
enrolment ratio primary school
school enrolment
entrants ratio 
reaching 1997-2000*
grade 5 (gross)
1990 2000 1997-2000* 1997-2000* 
(gross) (net)
male female male female male female male female 1995 male female
-1999*
Iraq 51 20 55 23 111 91 100 86 72 47 29
Egypt 60 34 67 44 103 96 95 90 99 88 83
Iran 72 54 83 69 88 85 74 73 98 81 75
Jordan 90 72 95 84 101 101 93 94 98 86 89
Syria 82 48 88 60 113 105 99 94 92 46 41
Middle East 
and North Africa 66 39 74 52 95 86 83 75 93 68 62
Source: UNICEF www.unicef.org/files/Table 5_english.xls
Table 4.5 illustrates the decline of Iraq’s education system in comparison to
neighbouring and comparator countries – Jordan, Egypt, Iran and Syria. Iraq’s
illiteracy rate for the year 2000 was at 45 per cent for men and 77 per cent for
women, which is higher than in any one of the comparator countries. Despite the
scarcity of available studies, there are many signs that the literacy rate may even
be decreasing, reflecting the deteriorating quality of the educational system. The
Iraq Living Conditions Survey, for example, finds that the youth literacy rate
(age 15-24) is higher than the literacy rate of the total population, but lower than
for the age group 25-34. To a certain extent, this is indicative of the change in
the educational system over time and appears to confirm that Iraq’s education
system is currently on a downward slope. It will be necessary to reverse this
trend by restoring and upgrading the schooling system.
Another indicator of a country’s human capital and scientific progress is the
number of publications produced in refereed recognized international journals
(Table 4.6). Arab countries have fallen behind industrialized countries and also
behind many Asian developing countries, as demonstrated by the Arab Human
Development Report from 2002 (UNDP, 2002).
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Table 4.6: Arab science and technology output, papers published 
in refereed international journals
(No. of publications)
1970-75 1990-95
Iraq 380 931
Egypt 3261 12,072
Jordan 61 1,472
Syria 38 471
Saudi Arabia 126 8,306
Source: UNDP, Arab Region Human Development Report, Statistical Appendix, New
York, 2002
Table 4.6 gives some credence to the view that the scientific and technological
research capability level of Iraq was comparable or even exceeded many Arab
nations in the 1970s. Although Iraq increased its science and technology publi-
cations two and a half times, the other countries did much better – Egypt went
up by a factor of 3.7, Jordan by 24, Syria by 12, and Saudi Arabia even by 66.
There are no reasons to believe that Iraq will not be able to repeat such devel-
opments and catch up in the long run. 
Box 4.2 Rebuilding statistical capacity in Iraq
Rebuilding statistical capacity is an important contribution to reconstruc-
tion and capacity building in Iraq. The effective design of employment and
social policy requires data of sound quality that are up-to-date and transpa-
rent. Statistical data are often an invaluable source for the different agents
in the labour market such as businesses, workers’ organizations and job
seekers. Although the data situation has improved in the last two years –
most notably through the ILCS household survey of 2004 – significant
gaps remain. Currently COSIT is the main centre of statistical competence
in the Iraqi Government. Major capacity building interventions have been
conducted by the ILO and other UN agencies, but more is required. Cir-
cumstances permitting, COSIT’s employment and unemployment survey
should be implemented at more regular intervals and its underlying defi-
nitions could be made more explicit. Also, targeted surveys on employers’
needs for specific skills and characteristics of youths would be useful for
employment purposes. Experience from other countries suggests that close
collaboration between the statistical office and other parts of the Govern-
ment is crucial. This could help the statistical office to become a service
provider for all Government agencies.
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SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND LABOUR MARKET REGULATION
Important elements for a well functioning labour market are an effective regu-
latory framework and constructive social dialogue between representatives of
employers and workers. Collective bargaining and negotiation can take place at
plant, district, sector or national levels, but for industrial relations to be on a
sound footing both parties should have the legitimacy of being both representa-
tive and independent. This should apply in the private as well as in the public
sector. The rules of the negotiating process are set by labour regulations. After
2003, the Iraqi Government made early progress by initiating the revision of the
labour law and a draft Labour Code was prepared with ILO assistance, but this
has still not been adopted. Also as noted by the ILO Committee on Freedom of
Association in October 2005, the laws banning trade unions introduced by the
last regime still remain in force. The Committee looked forward to the adoption
of the new Labour Code so as to ensure full protection of the right to organize
and to bargain collectively for all workers, employers and their organizations in
Iraq and ensure that the laws banning trade unions in local and national Gov-
ernments are repealed. 31
Development of social dialogue in Iraq
Through a 1958 law (issued in 1959) the rights of workers were recognized in
Iraq, and a legal framework for industrial interest intermediation, arbitration and
conflict resolution was established. In the late 1980s, however, the Baath regime
adopted a different approach leading to a general deterioration of rights. This
was noted with regret throughout the 1990s by the ILO Committee of Experts
and Committee on Freedom of Association. The draft Labour Code currently
under discussion lays down the conditions under which a workers’ association
must be recognized for bargaining purposes. On such a basis, the social partners
can expect to play a consultative role in the formulation of State policy on such
issues as unemployment and safety and health measures.
Rules for hiring and employment termination
Labour regulation rules usually set certain minimum standards for hiring and
employment termination, although these may need interpretation through nego-
tiation. The rules for dismissal especially must be transparent and practical to
ensure compliance and facilitate enforcement. The currently applicable law of
1989 requires companies to make use of an Employment Office, if they wish to
recruit workers. It lays down the procedures and time limits to be observed by
companies and offices for that purpose. Subject to certain exceptions, companies
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31 See Committee on Freedom of Association Report on the Iraq (Case No. 2453) Report
No. 342 (Vol. LXXXVIX, 2006, Series B, No.2) http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/
normes/libsynd/ LSGetParasByCase.cfm
are required to accept workers with suitable qualifications who have been
referred to them by the Employment Office (Article 17). Further, employers can
only terminate employment relationships if the reason for the termination is
down-sizing of the enterprise and after going through an arbitration process. 
In the new regulatory framework it would be important to combine a degree of
flexibility for firms to adjust to changing market conditions while ensuring
income and employment security to workers. An important ingredient of success
is that the labour market policies be institutionalized. 32 Tripartite social dialogue
is necessary for designing and implementing effective labour market policies.
Tripartism will aid the acceptance of change, improve the design of regulations
and policies and ensure sustainable financing.
The draft Labour Code includes a number of safeguards, so as to avoid abuses
to the detriment of the workers. The lack of progress in passing the new law must
of course be understood in the light of the exceptional circumstances in Iraq.
However, a failure to keep labour law relevant and updated may risk leading to
arbitrary ad-hoc decisions and may discourage enforcement. To move towards
strengthened institutions both issues must be addressed in parallel: a legal update
and greater emphasis on compliance and enforcement. The ultimate priority,
however, must be a development towards better respect for the rule of law. 
Wage setting
In Iraq, wage setting for public administration and State-owned-enterprises is
defined by law. The 1989 Labour Code states that the wage rate shall not be
lower than the minimum wage for an unskilled worker, which is fixed at regu-
lar intervals by a tripartite committee established by the Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs. The Coalition Provisional Authority established a minimum wage
of Iraqi Dinars 69,000 (US$7) per month. However, as the World Bank notes, it
is unclear whether the wage is in fact binding on employers and whether it is
enforced (World Bank, 2005). The draft Labour Code under discussion raises
the possibility for a slightly different approach. According to this proposal, the
minimum wage will be fixed by the Government after consultation with a tri-
partite minimum wage board that will need to be established. 
Social partners
Social dialogue is based on a legal framework, but whether it can be effective
depends on capable federations of workers’ and employers’ associations. Social
partners can play an important role in industrial relations and in the settling of
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32 The ILO has contributed substantially to the discussion on adjustment, flexibility and
workers’ protection in the framework of globalized economies. See Auer, P. and Cazes, S. (2003),
Employment stability in an age of flexibility, ILO Geneva; Cazes, S. and Nesporova A. (2003),
Labour markets in transition: Balancing flexibility and security in Central and Eastern Europe,
ILO, Geneva; Auer, P. Berg, J. and Coulibaly, I (2005), “Is a stable workforce good for productiv-
ity”, International Labour Review, Volume 144/3.
labour disputes, and on this basis they can play a consultative role in the formu-
lation of State policy on such issues as unemployment, safety, and health measures. 
Since 2003, employers’ and workers’ organizations have reconstituted them-
selves. The organization of employers is the Iraqi Federation of Industries. It rep-
resents mainly the food processing sectors, basic processing industries, and some
other small industrial sectors. The principal functions of the federation are (1) to
represent the interest of its members with Government and other authorities,
(2) to exchange views with the Government on industrial policies and strategies,
and (3) to represent Iraqi employers in tripartite schemes of the Government and
in international organizations. 
Prior to the take-over of power by the Baath Party, a number of different trade
union federations existed. The Baath Party set up a single “official” federation
in the 1970s. Thus after 2003, it was recognized that it was necessary for Iraq to
re-establish independent unions. There has been some progress in this field,
although as noted earlier the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU) and the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU)
has filed a complaint with the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association alleg-
ing that the authorities have adopted Decree No. 875 which gives the Govern-
ment control over the finances of existing trade unions and revokes previous
arrangements that allowed them to operate without undue interference and
harassment from the State and had legitimized free trade unionism for the first
time since the 1970s. 33
In 2005, the three major trade unions that had established themselves signed a
joint agreement in Damascus supported by the International Confederation of
Arab Trade Unions. According to this agreement they will elect a unified body
responsible for representing workers within a tripartite committee of work and
social security.
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33 In its recommendations the Committee on Freedom of Association invited the authorities
to repeal Decree No. 875 and to enter into full discussions with all concerned parties so that a solu-
tion may be found that is satisfactory to all parties concerned and keep it informed of any progress
in this respect. 

CHAPTER 5. EMPLOYMENT 
IN SMALL ENTERPRISES
INTRODUCTION
According to recent surveys, 60 per cent of Iraq’s working population, or
2.3 million people, earn their living through running or working in a private or
family business. Given the large size of Iraqi families, approximately 6.4 mil-
lion non-workers are thus dependent on these incomes as their sole source of
livelihood. These businesses are almost exclusively SMEs. The key to sustain-
able job creation in Iraq is therefore to focus on small enterprises and their pro-
ductive development (ILCS, 2004). 
This requires a policy that recognizes the central priority of small enterprises as
a source of livelihood and sets the right conditions for their growth. At present,
the high level of continuous violence poses a fundamental obstacle to investment
in the private sector. However, the Iraqi Government needs to act to tackle some
of the problems constraining entrepreneurship. Restoring an orderly policy and
regulatory environment for SMEs is therefore one of the high priority tasks iden-
tified by the Iraqi Higher Council on Employment Creation and is also endorsed
by the current National Development Strategy. 
This chapter identifies and addresses some relevant issues for improving the
policy environment of small enterprises in Iraq. It describes the macroeconomic
as well as the legal and policy level factors determining the potential of SMEs
to create new employment. It relates them to international best practices and sug-
gests possible ways for the Iraqi Government to improve the situation. 
The chapter is organized as follows: it first looks at the size, employment inten-
sity, and remuneration levels in the private sector. This is followed by a brief
analysis of the historical role that the private sector has played over the past
decades, and how this has been affected by broader macroeconomic trends and
developments. 
It then goes on to explore the policy and regulatory environment, discussing
the fields of business registration, labour relations, and taxation policies. Next,
these policy fields are linked to the role of financial institutions. Finally, some
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recommendations for the design of policies are made to promote employment by
means of developing small enterprises. 
The state of SMEs in Iraq
The abbreviation SME for the purpose of this report refers to all establishments
with a headcount lower than 30 employees. 34 All enterprises with one to four
workers are considered to be micro enterprises and those with five to nine work-
ers small. Those with 10 to 29 workers are defined as medium sized and those
with 30 and more as large. By definition, SMEs are non-agricultural establish-
ments in private ownership.
The present analysis draws on three statistical sources: (i) The Iraq Living Con-
ditions Survey (ILCS) from 2004, (ii) data drawn from the files of the Iraqi Gen-
eral Taxation Commission (GTC) from 2005 and (iii) a business climate survey
conducted in 2004. To date, no establishment survey has been implemented. The
data are sufficient, however, to give a tentative overview of the size and sector
distributions of employment in small enterprises and their degree of formalization.
Table 5.1: Employment in the private sector by enterprise size and industry: 2004
Manufacturing Trade and services Public administration, All
and construction education, and health
Micro enterprises
(< 5 persons.) 402,064 56% 1,320,543 89% 119,875 77% 1,842,481 78%
Small enterprises
(5 to < 10 persons.) 222,733 31% 97,043 7% 18,893 12% 338,669 14%
Medium enterprises
(10 to < 30 persons) 77,880 11% 46,316 3% 13,013 8% 137,209 6%
Large enterprises
(> 30 persons) 13,649 2% 15,862 1% 3,655 2% 33,166 1%
All 716,325 1,479,765 155,435 2,351,526 
Source: ILCS, 2004. The data used are from the files IMIRARoster.saw and IMIRAMain.saw, both dated 26/11/2004.
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34 As there is no nationally accepted and official definition of SMEs in Iraq, the one pro-
posed here is only one of many possibilities. In other countries, it is not unusual to refer to enter-
prises with up to 99 employees as ‘small’ – as in Mexico. However, in the case of Iraq, this defini-
tion would not be useful as there are only very few private companies on the upper margins of the
small enterprise size scale. Widening the definition to companies with up to 100 employees would
yield less than one percentage point (about 0.5) of employment in the ‘large’ size category. In Iraq,
it is therefore common to refer to private enterprises with less than 30 workers as ‘small and
medium-sized’. A survey of industrial establishments conducted in 1983, for example, referred to
industrial enterprises with less than 30 employees and less than Iraqi Dinars 100,000 of fixed assets
in non-power generating equipment as ‘SMEs’ (Al-Khudayri, 2002, p.204).
Employment in micro, small and medium-sized enterprises
An overwhelming majority of the people working in private businesses in Iraq
work in micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and only a tiny minority in
large firms. In the non-agricultural private sector 92 per cent of those employed
work in enterprises with less than ten employees. A further six per cent work in
enterprises with less than 30 workers, and only one per cent work in enterprises
with more than 30 workers. Furthermore, employment within the SME category
appears to be concentrated at the lower end of the spectrum. When it comes to
size, 78 per cent of those employed in the private sector work in micro enter-
prises with less than five employees (ILCS, 2004). 
To a certain extent these observations are also indicative of the conditions of
work in SMEs, since employment conditions are typically worse and productiv-
ity is lower in micro enterprises than in larger ones. An ILO comparative study
of seven developing and transitional countries 35 found that jobs in small enter-
prises are less remunerated, less productive, and of poorer quality on average
than jobs in larger enterprises, even after controlling such factors as gender and
skills endowment. Considering that the economically weakest members of Iraqi
society are usually not unemployed, but in fact part of the working population,
it is probable that the poorest urban Iraqis find their source of livelihood in the
micro or small enterprise segment. 
The ILCS (2004) data on private sector employment also suggest that women
are relatively underrepresented in SMEs – which is typical for Middle Eastern
labour markets. The share of women in large public enterprises and in farms is
much higher than their corresponding share in micro, small and medium-sized
enterprises. This trend reflects traditional gender roles, in which the civil serv-
ice tends to be one of the few socially acceptable professions for women. Like-
wise, working on a family farm or as a white-collar worker in industry has also
been an acceptable occupation for women in Middle Eastern societies.
Formal private enterprises in Iraq
In 2005, a total of 1.3 million private companies were registered for taxation pur-
poses in Iraq, and they can therefore be considered as part of the formal econ-
omy. This is supported by data from the taxation file of the GTC, 36 which is
shown in Table 5.2. The table suggests that SMEs are fairly well included in the
taxation system compared to other countries affected by conflict. Yet the high
tax-registration rate does not necessarily imply that staff of SMEs are also for-
malized and have regular employment contracts. It is possible that a consider-
able number of employees have only informal contracts, even if the enterprises
were registered for taxation. 
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35 The countries were Chile, Guinea, Pakistan, Peru, South Africa, United Republic of Tan-
zania, and Viet Nam (Reinecke & White, 2004).
36 As of Income Tax Law No. 113 of 1982, para. 2, amended.
According to the data from the GTC, SMEs were concentrated in a few specific
subsections and professional categories: the category “taxis and transportation”
alone accounted for 30.8 per cent of all registered enterprises – mainly consisting
of taxi drivers, of which almost half a million have been registered. Other sizable
sub-sectors include trade and to a lesser extent manufacturing and construction. 
Several points should to be kept in mind when reading the data from the GTC:
the data have the advantage of being “official figures” instead of being merely
estimated figures. Yet, at the same time, they may have been subject to several
biases and uncertainties. First, many small businesses may not have been regis-
tered with the taxation office. Second, in some companies more than one person
may have been eligible for company income tax under Income Tax Law 113.
Furthermore, it is possible that some companies appear several times in the file,
as several associates of a limited liability company may have been eligible for
company income tax, and these associates may appear in the file as well. The
file therefore needs to be read with caution. Yet, the margin of error is not great,
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Table 5.2: Entrepreneurs registered with the General Taxation Commission and 
the Directorate for Industrial Development
Total Per cent
Manufacturing and Construction
Industrial Services and Crafts (Goldsmiths, Tools Maintenance) 10,500 0.8
Furniture Manufacturing and Carpentry Services 4,600 0.3
Food Supply
– Bakeries 8,000 0.6
– Others 2,700 0.2
Carpentry Factories 1,300 0.1
Garment Industry 2,700 0.2
Construction 41,000 3.1
Foodstuffs 10,700 0.8
Agricultural Industry 2,700 0.2
Carpentry 1,300 0.1
Paper Manufacturing 1,000 0.1
Automobile Related Manufacturing 900 0.1
Rubber and Plastic 600 0.0
Enterprises Registered with the Directorate for Industrial Development 55,000 4.1
Sub Total 143,000 11
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Table 5.2: (continued)
Total Per cent
Trade and Services
Semi Skilled Services (Carpenters, Bakers, Own Account Workers)
– Freelancers 88,693 6.6
– Private Services 43,686 3.3
– Other 7,421 0.6
Taxi and Transportation
– Taxi 414,500 30.8
– Pick-up Cars 121,500 9.0
Unclassified Services 44,000 3.3
Transport and Automotive Maintenance 209,500 15.6
Miscellaneous Services
– Hotels and Restaurants 26,866 2.0
– Body Care Services 16,400 1.2
– Other 27,734 2.1
Specialized Services (Legal Professionals, Technicians) 26,284 2.0
Health Services 24,167 1.8
Literature and Artistic Services 8,400 0.6
Fuel Services 886 0.1
Food Supply Services 65,300 4.9
Wholesale and retail traders
– Import-Export Retailing 21,600 1.6
– Peddlers/Salespersons 2,600 0.2
– Retailers 2,700 0.2
– Other 5,700 0.4
Clothing and Accessory Retailing 18,000 1.3
Retailing of Manufactured Goods
– Accessory and Spare Part Retailers 10,000 0.7
– Other 3,900 0.3
Garment Retailers 6,600 0.5
Domestic Retailers 3,700 0.3
Leisure Retailers and Services 475 0.0
Sub Total 1,200,612 89.4
TOTAL 1,343,612 100.0
Source: Al Umari & Altimen, 2005
as the data from the ILCS (2004) also suggest a similar number – slightly more
than one million SMEs. 37
The size of the SME sector is one important aspect of the overall picture. Yet, in
order to judge whether the extension of SME employment is desirable from a
socio-economic perspective, it is necessary to consider the job quality in SMEs.
This question is linked directly to the question of poverty alleviation, which is
the central objective underlying the current efforts to improve the policy envi-
ronment for SMEs.
There is little empirical information available on other job quality indicators
such as insurance and retirement payments, maternity allowances, sick leave and
training. Yet, it can be safely assumed that micro enterprises scored low or at
best moderately on all these indicators – almost certainly lower than State-
owned enterprises. In general, the educational level of workers is lower in the
private sector, and there is a lack of formal training for the skills required to run
a small enterprise, since the vocational schools and training centres cater to the
needs of State industries and commerce. Training in SMEs is mainly informal
and on-the-job. There can be little doubt that the job quality in SMEs in the pri-
vate sector is perceived as having lower value and prestige than the job quality
in the Government sector. This should not be taken to mean that SME employ-
ment is inferior and therefore less deserving of the attention of policy makers
than larger enterprises. Rather, it shows that small and medium-sized enterprises
provide employment to socially disadvantaged groups and that they help to inte-
grate these groups into the labour market. Their potential to provide sustainable
and quality employment opportunities must however be improved.
Major business constraints
Figure 5.1 shows that the business regulatory environment (including “uncer-
tainty”) is only one of many factors that respondents perceived as important to
SME development. It is notable that crime, theft and disorder were ranked as some
of the most important factors determining the lack of business success, as reported
by a survey for which around 700 SMEs in the Southern Governorates were inter-
viewed in February and March 2004 (Economic Institute, 2004). In 2003, the
Iraqi-American Chamber of Commerce & Industry conducted a survey for the
whole country, resulting in very similar findings. Not surprisingly, crime, theft and
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37 The total number of SMEs (including the non-registered) can be estimated on the basis of
the data from the ILCS (2004). Dividing the total number of workers in each size category by the
average enterprise size for this category yields an estimate of the number of enterprises within each
size category. Using this method would suggest 1,053,482 micro enterprises and 56, 982 small
enterprises. However, this estimate is not very accurate for three reasons: first, the estimates are
particularly uncertain for the larger enterprises, as respondents are few. Second, as workers in the
same enterprise may live close together (e. g. in the case of the company town), standard devia-
tions become large since the ILCS used a cluster sample. Third, workers in large establishments
are likely to misreport the number of co-workers, because in many cases they will not know the
precise number.
disorder were on top of the list of constraints to growth of private business. Lack
of electricity was another significant obstacle. Many small businesses reported
frequent power shortages and stable power only few hours a day on average. 
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Figure 5.1: Major constraints for business growth in Southern Iraq
Note: The data used is from ECON, Oslo, Norway. A sample of 750 establishments were
interviewed for this survey during February and March 2004 covering the provinces of Basra, Al
Muthanna and Dhi Qar.
Source: Economic Institute, 2004
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SME SECTOR
Development up to 2003
The development of the SME sector should be seen within the context of the
development of the Iraqi economy before 2003. The huge fluctuations of this
economy in the period from 1968 to 2001 are depicted in Figure 5.2. 38
Figure 5.2: Iraqi gross domestic product per capita: 1968 – 2001 (US$ in 2002)
Source: Estimates by COSIT, 2004
Figure 5.2 gives the development of Iraqi GDP per capita between 1968 and
2001 as estimated by the Iraqi Statistical Office. The negative impact of three
subsequent wars (1980, 1988, and 1990) and of the embargo regime (from 1990)
is clearly visible from this figure, as the economy has been shrinking drastically
since 1989 with an equally grave depression in aggregate demand. Once a
middle-income country, Iraq was an impoverished country in 2004. The only
exceptions to this tragic development were three Northern Governorates
(Dohuk, Erbil, and Suleimaniyah), where great losses during the wars were
offset by an economic recovery during the 1990s. The lasting economic depres-
sion has left many traces on the labour market. One of them has been the increase
of SMEs’ share in non-agricultural employment. Much of the employment gen-
erated during that period was informal, or only partially formal in nature, often
of inferior quality compared to the work in larger enterprises.
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38 Levels of annual GDP per capita are obtained by dividing annual GDP at current market
prices by the total population. This table is based on market prices of the year 2002 (in US$).
In summary, within the Baathist developmental framework the private sector
remained marginalized and was often the last resort source of employment. This
resulted in the emergence of a large number of micro and small enterprises but
of few enterprises in the middle of the size spectrum (30 – 100 employees).
These middle-size enterprises were usually the result of small enterprises grow-
ing larger. Typically this occurred because the law of economies of scale or tech-
nical innovation gave them a competitive edge against other businesses. How-
ever, in the context of two subsequent wars and a strictly monitored economic
embargo, the business climate was apparently not suitable for business expan-
sion – and as a consequence businesses remained small. Therefore, up to the
present almost no enterprises larger than 30 employees can be found outside of
the public sector.
SMEs in post-Baathist Iraq
Since the fall of the Baathist regime in 2003, the macroeconomic environment
for SMEs has been influenced by three main factors: first, the country had wit-
nessed a paralysis of economic activities due to ongoing conflicts. This paraly-
sis was visible in the deterioration of production establishments suffering from
acts of sabotage and looting. Second, new business opportunities for SMEs have
opened up due to reconstruction and rehabilitation activities as well as to the
trade of imported goods 39 that have flooded the markets. Unfortunately, the net
result of these two trends has been a further delay of the desperately needed
recovery process: SME market opportunities have suffered from a reduction in
investment incentives and high-risk costs. Infrastructure reconstruction projects
have remained out of reach for small businesses, as contracts were mainly
awarded to foreign companies with insufficient Iraqi participation in terms of
employment and returns. The third major influence has been the continuation of
the SME sector as a last resort employer. Those who lost their jobs in the army
and law enforcement have often turned to the SME segment as the only remain-
ing source of employment and livelihood. This also includes enterprises that take
advantage of the legal gaps and minimal Government control to make quick and
easy revenue. Yet, despite these negative circumstances, the Iraqi population has
displayed remarkable resilience in dealing with these difficult circumstances.
Most surveys conducted to date show some confidence in Iraq’s recovery. Public
sector salaries have increased dramatically, which in turn has stimulated con-
sumer spending. Import barriers were removed, which appears to have created
a boom in the retailing of imported goods. On the other hand, most observers
agree that this is not the kind of sustainable economic recovery that Iraq will
need to remove the pressure on its labour markets. 
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39 The World Bank Needs Assessment (2003) notes for example that traders are very active
and have flooded the market with so called “white goods”. This is a term used for all kinds of elec-
tronic consumer devices such as washing machines and refrigerators. Some streets have become
similar to open-air fairs for consumer goods, for sale at every available location.
Creating an orderly environment for SMEs
According to the ILO Recommendation on Job Creation in Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises (1998, No. 189), the most essential prerequisite for small enter-
prises to grow is an orderly institutional environment. It is further considered
vital to find the right balance between the need to remove barriers for business-
investment and the need to ensure respect for workers’ rights. This means creat-
ing institutions that allow small enterprises to move from the periphery to the
centre-stage of economic and social development. The following section will
discuss constraints to productive development of small and medium-sized enter-
prises and relate this to international best practice in building sustainable insti-
tutions for the productive development of SMEs. 
ILO research synthesized in Reinecke and White (2004) shows that small enter-
prises that comply with registration and licensing requirements create more
employment over time than those that do not comply. Some countries have had
positive experiences in adopting special SME laws, in which all legal provisions
are streamlined in order to reduce the costs of compliance for small enterprises.
This usually results in more enterprises that benefit from the many advantages
that being part of the private sector entails. In Iraq, these efforts are in their
infancy, since Iraq neither had an SME policy nor a well developed strategy for
private sector development, and policy has yet to overcome the Baathist legacy.
Recently the process of reforming the policy environment for SMEs has been
initiated, but care must be taken that the interests of micro enterprises are duly
considered in the reform process. 
The current business environment is hampered by a lack of legal capabilities in
the commercial field to ensure an orderly business environment. This lack of law
enforcement is based on unclear, ambiguous and overlapping provisions of busi-
ness law which make compliance with the law difficult and pushes enterprises
into a legal grey zone. The American Coalition Provisional Authority legislation
conducted some changes to the business regulations – notably permitting single-
member limited liability companies and streamlining some of the registration
procedures, but, as further detailed in the Annex to this chapter, some deficien-
cies persist: in 2004, the registration procedure entailed 11 different steps, and
entrepreneurs could expect to wait for 77 days, until formal registration for a
medium-sized limited liability company was granted. Also, the law lacked
coherent and detailed provisions on rights and obligations of enterprises’ sole
proprietorship, which is usually the legal status suitable for SMEs. However,
these changes did not address Iraq’s central problems of legal uncertainty and
poor capability to enforce contracts. What is currently most needed is the devel-
opment of an effective judicial system and sufficient legal capacities to ensure
rule of law and the enforcement of contracts.
According to ILO experience, a revision of the regulatory framework should not
be conducted in an ad-hoc manner. It rather requires prior assessment of the
policy and regulatory framework and due consultation among representatives of
employers’ and workers’ organizations. A central factor in this endeavour is usu-
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ally the adoption of an officially recognized definition of small and medium-
sized enterprises, followed by an assessment of the impact of the regulatory
environment on small enterprises. Considering that the ongoing process of
reconstruction is accompanied by the persistence of high levels of violence, the
expectations for improvement of the working conditions for those working in
SMEs can only be modest. Clearly there is no “quick fix”. Yet, considering that
SMEs provide employment for the majority of people in the country, including
economically weak and marginalized groups, the situation of SMEs nonetheless
deserves full attention, as has been recognized in the International Compact for
Iraq which aims for the formulation and adoption of a new Commercial Code. 
A major challenge for the Iraqi labour law is to ensure that jobs in micro and
small enterprises are protected and decent. There is clear diversity in the ways
labour regulations should apply to small enterprises: While some countries, such
as Pakistan, provide that all enterprises below a minimal threshold size are
exempt from labour laws, others, such as Chile, extend labour protection to
workers in SMEs (Reinecke and White, 2004). The 1987 Iraqi Labour Code pro-
vides for universal coverage, but compliance and enforcement remain unsatis-
factory. It is often stated that labour law restricts business investment and that it
provides a barrier to the growth of small entrepreneurship. Yet ILO research con-
ducted in several countries showed that deregulation of labour laws in this area
did not have a positive impact on entrepreneurship. This would suggest that the
costs of compliance need to be carefully weighed against potential gains in pro-
ductivity and workers’ welfare. According to ILO experience, general exemp-
tions for SMEs from labour-related laws leave workers unprotected and can
result in a growth trap where workers move to the informal sector (or do not pro-
vide contracts to their employees) once they reach the threshold size. Therefore
the focus should be on simplifying and lowering the cost of compliance. Spe-
cific administrative machinery could be established to decide whether differen-
tial treatment of small enterprises may be required, with due involvement of the
concerned employers’ and workers’ representatives. 40
Even if the exact extent to which SMEs ought to be subject to labour law needs
further discussion, there appears to be broad consensus that the current Labour
Code inherited by the present Iraqi Government is outdated and in need of revi-
sion. In 2004, the Government confirmed that such a revision was indeed
intended and one of the points on the governmental agenda. The current Labour
Code contains many provisions that are impractical for the SME sector and that
will, if implemented according to this law, appear to be difficult to implement
within the framework of the market economy. In particular, this refers to the reg-
ulation in the field of employment termination. The Draft Labour Code seeks to
introduce more flexibility in this regard, including by allowing establishments
with less than ten regular employees to terminate employment with notice. But
it also includes a number of procedural mechanisms to avoid abuses to the
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40 This recommendation is drawn from the ILO draft of the Iraqi Labour Code (Footnote 3,
ILO, 2004).
disadvantage of workers, including on the burden of proof required in court
when a worker challenges his dismissal.41 It is essential to recognize that the need
to combine flexibility with worker protection does not lead to the lowering of
core labour standards. A realistic minimum wage can be a useful point of refer-
ence but its level should be determined judiciously in terms of helping the lowest
paid workers. Labour inspection is then a very serious responsibility for the Min-
istry of Labour and Social Affairs. Labour legislation must be applied intelli-
gently to small enterprises, neither forcing firms out of business nor condoning
hazardous or underpaid employment. 42
In the area of social security and safety nets, Law No. 39 of 1971, currently in
force on social security, was applied only to private enterprises that employ three
or more workers (See Chapter 6). Revision of the law should give due consid-
eration to establishing a minimal size that can be periodically adjusted, with the
long-term goal to include all workers and self-employed under social protection
schemes. Mandatory social security contributions for the provision of health or
retirement benefits often become another contentious issue for small enterprises.
The level of contributions may seem high while workers are often unconvinced
that they are getting a good return for their money. In such circumstances nei-
ther worker nor employer has an interest in contributing and special provisions
usually need to be made. Casual workers and the self-employed also need dif-
ferent treatment. The development of smaller-scale schemes of social insurance
may be possible.
Table 5.3: Sources of revenue (in US$ million, 2004, 2005, 2006)
2004 2005 2006
Personal income tax 10 0.1% 31 0.2% 63 0.3%
Company income tax 21 0.2% 52 0.3% 104 0.5%
Oil revenues 12500 99.8% 19271 99.6% 20104 99.2%
Total 12531 19354 20271
Source: Government of Iraq 2004 budget
While taxation levels are usually among the key constraints for entrepreneur-
ship, this general rule is only partly relevant for Iraq, as shown in Table 5.3.
Despite the attempts of the Government to extend the revenue base of the State,
the table shows that company tax revenues in 2004 constituted only a small frac-
tion of the budgetary sources. According to the Government budget, income tax
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41 This is based on the Termination of Employment Convention (No. 158) 1982, which
allows some categories of workers to be excluded from its provisions in the event of special prob-
lems arising from the size or nature of enterprise. See Arturo Bronstein (2005), The Iraqi Draft
Labour Code, paper presented at the ICFTU Arab Regional Conference on “Trade Union Rights –
Promoting Human Rights at Work”; Amman, 9-10 February 2005.
42 http://www.solidaritycenter.org/files/ArabRegionalConferenceMarch2005.pdf 
was to reach half a percentage point of total Government sources by 2006. Much
more important then are taxation tariffs and trade regulations: the Iraqi market
is flooded today with various imported goods – many small-scale Iraqi goods
and even services face fierce competition. This development may have been
unavoidable, but it was certainly accelerated by the adoption of a zero tax regime
in 2003. Many Iraqis complain that Iraq exports oil and imports nearly every-
thing else. The agricultural and industrial sectors in particular are suffering from
competition from imported goods. 
The ILO’s Job Creation in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Recommenda-
tion, 1998 (No. 189) also highlights the importance of a sufficiently broad sup-
porting infrastructure for SMEs. This involves skills training for business start-
up and improvement, human resource development, as well as financial support.
The reconstruction effort shows some initiatives in this area, but they need to be
increased to come close to what the SME sector requires. Another field of action
is the need for business partnerships between SMEs and the public sector. This
applies to all countries, but in only in few countries is this as important as in Iraq,
which continues to be a State-dominated economy. Many countries have had
positive experiences counteracting the difficulty that small enterprises often
have when they attempt to benefit from public procurement opportunities. It will
further be necessary to develop and upscale affordable business development
services, which should be made broadly available. 
Another major barrier to business development is the underdeveloped, inade-
quate and underutilized banking system in Iraq. Access to credit and availabil-
ity of capital are of great concern to SMEs. Findings from questionnaires and
interviews show a very limited use of banking and financial services by SMEs
and the self-employed. Historically, the banking system in Iraq was unable to
cater to the financial needs of private sector development due to the inherent
weak capital base of its constituents, and limitations on the banking system’s
capacity to meet market needs. Credit activities were mostly limited to tradi-
tional services such as short and medium-term loans, credit letters and bill dis-
counting. In the absence of an effective formal financial system, small enter-
prises can only build upon retained profits, street moneylenders (charging
exhorbitant fees such as 25-40 per cent per month), or Rotating Savings and
Credit Associations (ROCSAs). The latter are groups run by women’s circles
that provide credit on a mutual basis but are ill-suited to provide finance for busi-
ness investment purposes.
Major factors behind this failure of access to credit for small enterprises were a
backward and limited legal and commercial institutional framework and the
exaggerated governmental constraints controlling banking activities. Finance
and lending polices adopted by banks are still exclusively commercial, requir-
ing high interest rates and remaining limited to short-term loans with exagger-
ated guarantees. Security issues are currently exacerbating these limitations.
Several cases of kidnapping, reported among industrialists, force entrepreneurs
to keep a low profile in their business activities and financial standing. The bank-
ing system and capital markets are witnessing major restructuring and develop-
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ment. Nineteen private banks have been founded since 2003, along with new
governmental, commercial and specialized banks (industrial, agricultural, social
and housing) and development funds. The latter include the economic and social
fund of the MoPDC, the industrial development fund of the Ministry of Indus-
try (MoI), and the export support fund of the Ministry of Trade (MoT). There
are also some donor microfinance projects that act as implementing partners of
international aid agencies. If successful these institutions should be upgraded to
reach significant impact. Business incubators could act as facilitators to bridge
the gap between SMEs and the financial sector. For SMEs to play out their full
job-creating potential, steps should be taken to improve the availability of
financing to SMEs including credit guarantees and concessionary financing
including packages targeted towards micro enterprises.
Box 5.1. Donor funded support for SMEs
A variety of donor funded projects on microfinance and entrepreneurship
development for SMEs have been implemented since 2003. These have
included the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
assistance programme called the “Community Action Programme”, which
consists of a variety of projects. These include Agricultural Cooperative
Development International/Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance
(ACDI/VOCA) covering the districts of Mosul, Kirkuk and the Iran/Iraq
border region, International Relief and Development (IRD) for the greater
Baghdad area, and the Community, Habitat, and Finance (CHF-Interna-
tional) for South and South Central Iraq. The latter initiative disbursed
funds to 16,000 people with a total volume of US$43 million as of May
2006, and also conducted large training interventions. According to CHF
reports, a 99 per cent repayment rate was recorded throughout the life of
the programme. Another donor organization is the UK DFID, which is
active through its Governance Capacity Building Programme (GCBP)
through which it administers the so-called Governorates Development
Fund. Other activities include the establishment of a provincial forum for
business associations, a business information centre and a business jour-
nal. These initiatives are complemented by in-country training courses on
“Growing Commercial Ideas”, “Enterprise Development” and “Women in
Enterprise”. According to DFID, by 2006 over 2,000 small-scale entre-
preneurs had benefited from these courses. Overall DFID had committed
£20.5 million to the GCBP as of March 2006. 
Source: Reed (2005) and information collected from reports of donor agencies.
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CONCLUSIONS
A concerted and coordinated approach will be necessary to move towards an
orderly business environment for SMEs. This process entails a number of ele-
ments, such as reducing the cost of compliance with the regulatory framework,
linking SMEs up with the formal credit market, empowering local entrepreneurs
with better skills, and improving access to Government procurement in recon-
struction. Finally, targeted policies are needed for value-chain upgrading. This
is spelled out in detail in the Annex to this chapter that draws on the action plan
adopted by the UN Iraq Employment Conference in 2004. 
All these are important aspects of the business environment. However, the most
significant obstacle that must be addressed clearly goes beyond the field of busi-
ness regulation. To move towards a more orderly business environment Iraq
needs to return to the rule of law and ensure contract enforcement. Iraq’s SME
sector would be best aided by the development of an effective judicial system
and sufficient legal capacities to ensure the rule of law and the enforcement of
contracts, and freedom from fear. This must be credibly guaranteed by an effec-
tive policing and law enforcement system.
Employment in small enterprises
67
ANNEX TO CHAPTER 5
Annex Table 5.1: List of technical recommendations for development of SMEs
68
• Formation of a technical advisory committee, supported by the
Employment Creation Secretariat, and linked to Higher
National Council on Employment Creation
• Mapping and assessment of the policy and regulatory frame-
work’s impact on SMEs with due consideration for micro
enterprises
• Establishing a sound legal and regulatory framework to focus
and manage the reform process
• Designing and reform policies for an enabling environment
and a proactive SME policy
• Fostering compliance with international labour standards,
including child labour and other labour standards within SMEs
• Focus efforts on promising sectors to foster the growth of
SMEs: reconstruction, oil sector, transport and distribution,
carpentry, information and communication technologies,
tourism, etc.
• Targeted at developing specific factors of production in the
SME sector (skills and human resources, credit)
• Targeted at fostering development of niche markets and
dynamic sectors of activity
• Setting up of industrial and new technologies estates
• Support private sector investment and partnerships with Min-
istry of Industry and Minerals in provision of infrastructure
Policy Environment 
and Development 
of an Enterprise Culture
Sectorial SME Policy
Industrial Policy 
and Supporting Infrastructure
for SME Development
Activities / Objectives
Regional and Local Policies
Association Building
Business Development 
Services (BDS)
Credit Lines and Incubators
Micro-Credit 
and Micro-Insurance
Entrepreneurship 
development 
and management skills
Agriculture
Housing
• Fiscal policy for SME promotion within targeted zones
• Capacity building of local authorities for enabling local busi-
ness environment. Public private partnership programmes
(PPP) to strengthen capacity of local authorities in procuring
from and promote SMEs
• Strengthening of member-based associations, particularly for
women and youth associations, to ensure that their voices are
heard 
• Promote sustainable, affordable, needs-based and commer-
cially driven Business Development Services for SMEs and
specific target groups, such as youth, women, and vulnerable
groups.
• Facilitate the provision of credits for SMEs, particularly for
strategic sectors such as housing and construction
• Setting up of business incubators for reduced infrastructure and
business services costs and for wider access to new informa-
tion and communication technologies
• Establishment of micro-credit institutions as implementing
partners within partnership programmes between international,
national, and local stakeholders. These institutions should be
gradually replaced by commercial banking for SMEs (or the
upgrading of micro-finance institutions into retail and com-
mercial banking) 
• Ensuring that capacities are built within new institutions, and
that they are aiming towards technical and financial sustain-
ability within a strategic plan
• Geographical scope: impoverished regions
• Strategic groups: young entrepreneurs, women, ex-soldiers,
vulnerable groups
• Strategic sectors: promising sectors, construction, housing,
small industries, non-agricultural rural sector
• Strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture and of
its regional and local agencies
• Ensure coordination with the Ministry of Labour and the Min-
istry of Planning for the design and implementation of pro-
grammes with a job creation potential
• Strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Housing and of its
regional and local agencies
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Activities / Objectives
Annex Table 5.2: Rough estimate of total SMEs in the private sector, 2004
Average Size Estimated Number
Micro Enterprise 1.75 1,053,482
Small Enterprise 5.94 56,982
Medium Enterprise 13.75 9,977
(Large Enterprise) (43.30) (248)
Total SMEs 1,120,441
Source: ILCS, 2004. The data used is from the files IMIRARoster.saw and IMIRA-
MAIN.saw, both dated 26/11/2004. 
Annex Table 5.3: Geographical distribution of currently employed persons in the private
sector by enterprise size: 2004
South Baghdad Centre North All
Micro Enterprise 649,787 522,144 447,839 222,711 1,842,481
Small Enterprise 118,549 88,107 92,588 39,424 338,669
Medium Enterprise 45,552 33,791 36,315 21,551 137,209
Medium Enterprise
(external definition) 
and Large Enterprise 10,359 9,899 8,694 4,214 33,166
All 824,247 653,942 585,437 287,900 2,351,526
Source: ILCS, 2004. 
Other Strategic Sectors 
(industries, 
new technologies)
• Ensure coordination between the Ministries of Labour and
Planning for the design and implementation of programmes
with a job creation potential
• Trade regimes and industrial policies tailored to the restructur-
ing needs of strategic sectors of activity
• Inter-ministerial coordination and integrated policies
• Vocational Education and Training
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CHAPTER 6. SOCIAL SECURITY IN IRAQ 
AND THE WAY FORWARD 
INTRODUCTION
Social security is a basic human right and has a key role to play in restoring
social cohesion in Iraq’s fragile social fabric. Important parts of its population
are now facing social exclusion. This is due to the combination of several fac-
tors, such as a high unemployment rate, especially among youth, the demobi-
lization of soldiers and militia men, the growing number of war and conflict vic-
tims with disabilities and of widows and widowers, and the internal and external
displacement of thousands of persons. Peace and stability in Iraq may only be
achieved through the implementation of appropriate mechanisms to provide at
least some basic degree of protection to those segments of the population that
are the most vulnerable. Ongoing conflict and sectarian violence in the country
have resulted in the establishment of a climate of insecurity and have hampered
efforts to curb widespread poverty. Hence, it is of the utmost importance that
social security – as an important tool to prevent and alleviate poverty and as an
instrument for sustainable social and economic development 43 – be provided to
the Iraqi population in the near future. Lastly, it must be underlined that the
establishment of proper social protection mechanisms can play an important part
in the development of democracy in Iraq while contributing to the political inclu-
sion and empowerment of the population. 44
The need for the adoption of coherent social security policies and the imple-
mentation of social protection mechanisms and safety nets in Iraq was discussed
at the International Employment Conference held in Amman in December 2004.
This has been reasserted by representatives of MOLSA and discussed in Decem-
ber 2005 at the ILO Workshop on a Social Security Strategy for Iraq in Geneva. 
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43 Resolution and conclusions concerning social security, International Labour Conference,
89th Session, Geneva, 2001.
44 ibid.
While in pre-conflict times there were well-established social security schemes
providing coverage to both public and private sectors, their application was sus-
pended during the 2003 invasion. In 2003, all schemes were replaced by emer-
gency payments for all. For the reasons described below, such payments are not
sustainable in the long run, hence the need to establish effective social security
mechanisms through technical assistance and a coordinated effort of the inter-
national community and donors. 45 Taking this into consideration, the present
chapter will set out an assessment of the situation of social security in Iraq and
try to identify the main orientations which should guide any social policy deci-
sion taken in respect of the implementation of social security schemes. In the
second part, an analysis of the legal, administrative and financial social security
background will be conducted, focusing on the main pre-war and current social
protection mechanisms and measures, the weaknesses of the social security
system in place and the administrative and financial contexts of social security
in the country. Finally, in the last part, the main policy considerations will be
identified which should guide any reform of the actual social security system
and present the way forward. 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND 
OF SOCIAL SECURITY
In order to assess the needs and to identify the main priorities in terms of social
protection coverage, it is essential to first recall some of the socio-economic
characteristics of the country. This involves setting out some data on population,
labour market, and economic and financial systems in Iraq that are particularly
relevant for social security.
The total population of Iraq in 2005 was estimated at 28.8 million, of which
14.6 million (50.7 per cent) were men and 14.2 (49.3 per cent) women. Accord-
ing to United Nations data for the 2000-2005 period, the life expectancy at birth
for men was 57.3 years of age and 60.4 for women. For pension scheme analy-
sis purposes, it may be pointed out that life expectancy at age 60 was 15 years
for men and 16 years for women (United Nations, 2005).
A large share of the labour force was engaged in public sector activities. Out of
the 6,002,000 employed persons, 1,794,000 (approximately 30 per cent) were
employed by the public sector 46 (1,286,000 men and 508,000 women), while the
remaining 4,210,000 (approximately 70 per cent) were employed by the private
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45 Such need has been recognized by MOLSA and discussed in December 2005 at the ILO
Workshop on a Social Security Strategy for Iraq. As a follow-up, an official request for technical
assistance was made by MOLSA to the Social Security Department of the ILO.
46 References to public-sector employees comprise those employed by the central and local
or Government, State-owned enterprises and the Iraqi army.
sector (3,744,000 men and 466,000 women) (ILCS, 2004). 47 Out of these, 2,972,000
were employed by private companies (2,810,000 men and 162,000 women). 
According to data provided by MOLSA (2005), the non-working age popula-
tion of the country in 2004 was approximately 10.7 million, comprised of
1,296,000 State pensioners (public sector workers) and 14,125 social security
pensioners (private sector workers). 
Concerning the social security coverage of the employed population, the data for
2004 indicates that all public sector employees (1,794,000) were insured under
the State pension scheme administered by the Iraqi Ministry of Finance. The
same data show that, out of 2,972,000 private company employees, only 80,502,
or less than 3 per cent, were registered with MOLSA – responsible for the admin-
istration of the social insurance scheme – and thus covered by the scheme (2005).
These represented only 1.2 per cent of the economically active population of Iraq
in 2004. One of the reasons given by MOLSA for such a low degree of coverage
is that, under the law establishing the private sector social security scheme, 48
companies with less than three employees are under no obligation to join the
scheme and are not subject to the payment of contributions. 49 The data further
indicate that, out of the 80,502 private sector employees registered with MOLSA
under the pension scheme, only 35,697 contributed to the social security scheme
in the first quarter of 2005. 50 This, it is suggested, is due to the fact that out of the
24,315 private companies registered in the Business Registry of Iraq, only
12,177 were still active in the first quarter of 2005. Thus, it can be deduced that
a significant part of the Iraqi labour force works in informal employment with-
out any form of social security protection in the face of risk. 51
The available data show that per capita income is estimated to have fallen by
nearly one half between 2001 and 2004, when it stood at US$780. 52 Iraq is thus
considered a low-income country, and, although there are very scarce data
available on the extent of poverty in the country, it was estimated that in 2004,
more than five million Iraqis lived below the poverty line (out of a 25 million
population). 53 The median hourly wage in Iraq in 2004 was Iraqi Dinars
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47 The results of this survey are also discussed and referred to by MOLSA in a document
entitled “Social security for employed labour force in Iraq”, December 2005, which was commu-
nicated to the ILO and presented by MOLSA representatives at the ILO, Geneva, in December
2005.
48 Law No. 39/1971.
49 According to information provided by MOLSA, this provision should soon be amended,
providing for the contribution to the pension schemes of all private employers.
50 MOLSA, “Social security for employed labour force in Iraq”, December 2005 (as dis-
tributed and presented at the ILO, Geneva, December 2005).
51 As underlined by MOLSA in “Social security for employed labour force in Iraq”, op.cit.
52
“Social protection in transition: Labour policy, safety nets and pensions”, Middle East and
North Africa Human Development Unit, World Bank, June 2005 (Draft), p. iii.
53
“Social security and safety nets in Iraq: Outstanding issues”, Paper prepared by the ILO
for the Conference on Jobs for the Future of Iraq held in Amman, 12-13 December 2004, Geneva,
December 2004, p. 2.
1,042 (US$0.72) for women, compared to Iraqi Dinars 694 (US$0.48) for men. 54
In 2004, wages in the public sector, which corresponded on average to Iraqi
Dinars 2,610,000 (with the exclusion of wages of the military and police), were
60 per cent higher than the median, while private sector wages, averaging Iraqi
Dinars 540,000 in 2004, were clearly the lowest, often found below 50 per cent
of the median hourly wage. 55
ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL
BACKGROUND OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN IRAQ
Main social protection mechanisms
Presently, there are in Iraq coexisting different mechanisms aiming to provide
some degree of social protection to the population. In response to the situation
of high unemployment, acute poverty and vulnerability engendered by the con-
flict, the transitional administration and the Iraqi Government have adopted spe-
cific emergency measures. As a result, the country has experienced in recent
years a shift in emphasis of social security programmes away from contributory
social insurance schemes towards food and other subsidies and social safety nets
targeted at basic needs for the most vulnerable. 56
Public social security schemes
Social security schemes were well established in Iraq before the 2003 war. They
were based on social insurance principles under which pensions and other ben-
efits were payable to insured persons upon occurrence of the contingency, sub-
ject to compliance with the length of service conditions and the payment of con-
tributions by employers and workers. Two main social insurance schemes
similar in their nature and in their benefit programme formed the core of the pre-
war social security system and applied to the public and private sectors. Both
schemes were designed with technical assistance from the ILO, as defined-ben-
efit arrangements with pay-as-you-go financing. 57 At the onset of the conflict,
they covered together about 15 per cent of the labour force, mostly comprised
of public sector workers.
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54 Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004, Volume I, op.cit., p.104, which suggests that higher
median wages for women could be related to the fact that “primarily women with higher education
have work, thus are paid more”.
55
“Social protection in transition: Labour policy, safety nets and pensions”, op.cit, p. 6 and 93.
56
“Social security and safety nets in Iraq: Outstanding issues”, op.cit.
57 In a defined-benefit scheme pensions are fixed by law and guaranteed by the Government.
The law entitles those who pay into the system a certain amount of benefit, according to a formula
that considers both the duration of contribution and levels of income. Pay-as-you-go financing
means that the contributions of those who pay into the system in a given year are used to pay the
beneficiaries of the same year.
The State pension system, established under Law No. 33 of 1966 (Civil Pension
Law), 58 provided for the entitlement of public servants, including State and
State-owned enterprise employees, to old age, disability and survivor’s benefit.
Under this scheme, public and semi-public sector workers were entitled to old-
age benefit upon completion of 25 years of pensionable service or after reach-
ing 50 years of age, after reaching 55 years of age and completing 30 years of
pensionable service, or after reaching 60 years of age, regardless of their period
of pensionable service. 59 Mandatory retirement age under this scheme was 63. 60
As an employer, the Government did not contribute to the scheme, which was
solely funded by employees’ contributions going from 7 to 10 per cent of their
monthly salary. 61 As for State-owned enterprises, they had the obligation, as
employers, to double the contribution of their employees. Old-age benefit was
based on the worker’s average salary over a certain period of time and on the
period over which a worker had contributed to the scheme. 62
Two specific schemes were added to the existing State social insurance scheme
for the public sector in 1975 63 and 1978 64 to cover the military and security
forces.
Mention should also be made of the adoption by the Transitional National
Assembly of the Unified Retirement Law, No. 27/2006, on 30 November 2005,
which entered into force on 17 January 2006. 65 By adopting this new law, the
Iraqi Parliament has unified the various old-age pension schemes applicable to
public-sector workers, such as State employees, the military and internal secu-
rity forces, SOE employees and other workers whose salary is paid by public
funds. The new Unified Retirement Law has replaced the pre-war legislation
governing the retirement of public sector employees. Under this new scheme,
the number of years of service and the level of last salary are used in the calcu-
lation of the amount of the benefit, while the legal age for retirement is set at
63 for a person with 25 years of service. 
In the private sector social insurance was established through the Workers’ Pen-
sion and Social Security scheme under Law No. 19 of 1971, providing workers
in this sector with a range of benefits in respect to a range of contingencies.
Under this scheme, old age, invalidity and survivors, and compensation in
respect of work injury and invalidity, maternity, and sickness were covered. Law
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58 See also the amendments to the Civil Pension Law: Law No. 76 of 1989 and Law No. 55
of 1988. 
59 Art. 3(1), (2) and (3), Law No. 33, 1966.
60 Art. 3(4), Law No. 33, 1966.
61 The amount of the contribution is determined by the employee’s salary level. Art. 5(1),
Law No. 33, 1966.
62 Article 6, Law No. 33, 1966.
63 Law No. 1, 1975.
64 Law No. 1, 1978.
65 Law No. 27/2006, Iraqi Official Gazette, No. 4015, 17 January 2006.
No. 19 of 1971, as amended, applied to all private establishments employing
three or more people, with the exclusion of agricultural workers, temporary
employees, domestic servants and family labour. The benefit provisions under
Law No. 19 are as follows:
Old-age benefit – Under the private sector scheme, the qualifying age for enti-
tlement to the benefit is 60 for men and 55 for women with 20 years of contri-
butions, or any age for men with 30 years of contributions and women having
contributed for 25 years. The amount of the benefit corresponds to 2.5 per cent
of the average wage of the last three years of work, multiplied by the number of
months of contributions and divided by 12, for a monthly minimum of Iraqi
Dinars 54 and a maximum of Iraqi Dinars 140. Workers who do not meet the
qualifying conditions are entitled to a lump sum corresponding to one month’s
pension for each year of contributions.
Invalidity benefit – The permanent or long-term loss of at least 35 per cent of a
person’s working capacity gives him/her entitlement to an invalidity benefit.
This is calculated using the same method as old-age benefit and is subject to the
same restrictions in terms of minimum and maximum amount. In the event of a
partial disability that would be less than 35 per cent of working capacity, the dis-
abled worker is entitled to a fraction of the full benefit proportionate to the
assessed degree of incapacity.
Survivor’s benefit – In case of the death of the breadwinner, the surviving spouse
is entitled, at any age, to a benefit corresponding to 60 per cent of the insured
person’s old-age pension. Sons of the breadwinner under age 17, under age 27
if students, or without age limit if disabled, and unmarried daughters under age
17 are entitled to a benefit equivalent to 40 per cent of the breadwinner’s old-
age benefit or to 60 per cent in the case of full orphans. The breadwinner’s
dependents (mother, father, sister or brother) are entitled to 40 per cent of the
breadwinner’s pension. The maximum amount of the survivor’s benefit is 100
per cent of the breadwinner’s pension.
Sickness and maternity benefits – Coverage in case of sickness and maternity is
also guaranteed to private sector workers and provided as cash and medical ben-
efits. There is no minimum qualifying period for entitlement to benefits, which
amount in the case of sickness to 75 per cent of the worker’s average wage
during the last three months preceding the onset of the illness, and to 100 per
cent of the worker’s wage upon occurrence of maternity. Sickness benefit is
payable after an 8-day waiting period, during which the employer must pay the
full wage, and up to a maximum of six months. 66 As for maternity benefit, it is
payable for at least ten weeks, including at least four weeks before the expected
date of confinement, which may be extended in case of complications at a rate
of 75 per cent of the worker’s wage. Maternity leave is covered for up to six
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66 Entitlement to a benefit corresponding to 100 per cent of the worker’s wage may be
granted for two years in case of an incurable or malignant disease.
months at any time during the first four years of the child’s life and up to the
fourth child, with a replacement rate of 50 per cent. In addition, a maternity grant
is provided for women who leave employment because of pregnancy, as a lump
sum corresponding to one month’s benefit for each year of contributions. Med-
ical benefits for the two contingencies are provided through Government health
centres and hospitals financed by the Labour and Social Security Institute. 67 As
for the coverage of workers’ dependants in terms of medical benefits, they are
equivalent to the benefits to which the insured person is entitled.
Work injury – There is no minimum qualifying period for entitlement to work
injury benefit, which amounts to 100 per cent of the wage on which contribu-
tions were last paid. In case of temporary disability, the benefit is payable after
an 8-day waiting period – during which the insured person is entitled to his/her
full wage – and until recovery or certification of permanent disability. Provided
that a worker is completely disabled, permanent disability benefits amount to
80 per cent of the average wage in the insured person’s profession. Partial dis-
ability corresponding to 32 per cent and up is compensated by a percentage of
the full pension proportionate to the assessed degree of incapacity, while an inca-
pacity of less than 32 per cent gives entitlement to a lump sum corresponding to
four years of partial disability pension. Disabled workers are also entitled to
medical benefits such as general medical care, home visits, surgery, specialist
care, hospitalization and medicine. As for the benefit to which surviving spouses
– widows or dependent disabled widowers – are entitled in the case of the death
of the breadwinner as a result of a work injury, it should correspond to 60 per
cent of the insured person’s permanent total disability pension or to a lump sum
equal to four years of the breadwinner’s partial disability pension. Orphans and
dependants are entitled to a benefit in the same proportion as the standard sur-
vivor’s benefit (see above).
Common provisions – The legislation requires both workers and employers to
contribute to the scheme, in a proportion of 5 per cent of the workers’ salary and
12 per cent of the employers’ payroll. As an exception, firms operating in the oil
sector are required to contribute the equivalent of 25 per cent of the payroll. Such
contributions are used for the financing of all benefits covered under the scheme
in a prescribed proportion.68 Under this scheme, all types of benefits are provided
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67 Medical services covered by the scheme include various forms of treatment and consul-
tations, such as: general and specialist care, hospitalization, surgery, medicine, X-rays, appliances,
laboratory services and rehabilitation.
68 According to Article 5 of Law No. 155 of 1971, which amended article 27(b) of the Work-
ers’ Pension and Social Security Law No. 39 of 1971, the 12 per cent contribution rate had to be
distributed as follows: 1 per cent to the Health Security Section; 3 per cent to the Work Injuries
Security Section and 9 per cent to the Pension Security Section. In the case where the employer
was required to contribute in a proportion of 25 per cent of the payroll, the rate had to be distrib-
uted as follows: 3 per cent to the Health Security Section; 3 per cent to the Work Injuries Security
Section; 15 per cent to the Pension Security Section; and 4 per cent to the Services Security Section.
as part of the social insurance system. Their collection and payment is adminis-
tered by the Pension Fund for Workers, 69 while the administration of the
programme is vested with the Labour and Social Security Institute, under the
general supervision of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.
Emergency payments
Emergency measures were taken by the Coalition Provisional Authority, in
response to the social crisis affecting the country in recent years. In 2003, the
Coalition Provisional Authority amended the two laws of 1966 and 1971 by way
of administrative decision, replacing pensions under both systems with emer-
gency payments. Simultaneously, reserves for the private sector social security
system, which represented at that time Iraqi Dinars 19 billion – less than 0.5 per
cent of GDP – were frozen in the Central Bank. From the moment this policy
entered into force, payments have been supported from the State budget. 
While all payments made in 2003 were of the same amount for everybody, 70
regardless of the length of service and the contributions paid into the scheme,
such “flat” payments were replaced in January 2004, by decision of the Ministry
of Finance of the Coalition Provisional Authority, by defined payments, increas-
ing the number of years of employment and the grade of pensioners upon retire-
ment. In 2004, benefits ranged between Iraqi Dinars 80,000 (US$53) and Iraqi
Dinars 200,000 (US$133). 71
Other public social safety nets
The main social safety net in Iraq is the Public Distribution System (PDS), which
started in 1991 as a programme to distribute domestically-produced food when
sanctions were first imposed on the country in the aftermath of the 1990 Gulf
War. In 1996, the implementation of the Oil-for-Food Programme under UN
supervision allowed Iraq to purchase food and other necessities using the pro-
ceeds from oil exports. Under the administration of the Ministry of Trade, the
PDS is implemented by State-owned enterprises and private sector companies.
It is made available to the entire population for a nominal fee and, as of June
2005, covered more than 90 per cent of Iraqis. 72 According to the WFP, up to a
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69 Article 14 of the Law No. 29 (1987) of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Revo-
lutionary Command Council Resolution No. 243, published in the Official Gazette of the Repub-
lic of Iraq, 10 June 1987). See also Chapter 3 of the Workers' Pension and Social Security Law No.
39 of 1971.
70 Emergency payments for the last three quarters of 2003 (April – December) corresponded
to US$20 per month (Iraqi Dinars 30,000) and were increased to US$27 (Iraqi Dinars 40,500) in
the first quarter of 2004. “Social protection in transition: Labour policy, safety nets and pensions”,
op.cit.
71 More precisely, emergency payments were diversified in the first quarter of 2004 in two
different amounts: US$67 for individuals having 25 years or more of service and US$50 for indi-
viduals having less than 25 years of service. Payments were further diversified in the third quarter
of 2004 in four categories, depending on the position and the number of dependents. “Social pro-
tection in transition: Labour policy, safety nets and pensions”, op.cit, p.48.
72 ibid, p. viii.
quarter of the Iraqi population was considered to be heavily dependent on the
food baskets provided under the PDS for basic nutrition and consumption in
2004. 73 It must be noted that, as of June 2005, the Government, in partnership
with major donors, planned to reform the PDS to make it more in accordance
with the population’s needs. 74
In addition, cash and in-kind public assistance are primarily provided to the most
vulnerable and to demobilized military personnel by MOLSA. Such aid includes
cash transfers, training and rehabilitation services, and other in-kind assistance.
Under the Family Care Allowance programme, certain categories of families
who lack adequate support are provided with a flat monthly cash benefit by
MOLSA, regardless of family size. Although there are no means or asset tests
for entitlement to the benefit, eligibility is determined on the basis of a person
falling into one of the prescribed categories of beneficiaries, which include the
blind and disabled unable to work, widowed or divorced women with children
and the elderly without pensions. In 2004, 113,000 families benefited from
monthly transfers of Iraqi Dinars 30,000 (US$21). 75
Demobilized military personnel covered under the Government demobilization
and reintegration programme are also provided with cash transfers. 76
As for in-kind assistance, it is mainly provided by MOLSA through institutional
care and rehabilitation services, in facilities such as orphanages, institutes for the
disabled, cooperatives and elderly homes. In 2004, roughly 6,300 persons ben-
efited from these various forms of assistance. 77
Lastly, it should be noted that the Government provides important price subsi-
dies, both direct and indirect, to individuals and companies, for services (such
as healthcare and education) and commodities (including pharmaceutical sup-
plies, electricity and oil). 78 / 79
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“Baseline Food Security Analysis in Iraq”, World Food Programme, Iraq Office, 2004,
p.6. 
74 Iraq’s National Development Strategy 2005-2007, Ministry of Planning and Development
Cooperation of the Republic of Iraq, 30 June 2005, p. xii.
75 According to the World Bank (2005), “…the family care benefit given to families amounts
to almost 5% of the estimated median income of the lowest quintile of the Iraqi population”,
“op.cit., p.36
76 Figures from the 2004 and 2005 budgets indicated that the average benefit provided to
demobilized military personnel amounted, for each of these two years, to 17 per cent of the median
income of the lowest income quartile. Ibid. p. 36.
77 ibid, p.37.
78 According to the World Bank (2005), the cost of supporting commodities and services is
very important for the Government and significantly increased between 2004 and 2005. For more
information on price subsidies, see “Social protection in transition: Labour policy, safety nets and
pensions”, op.cit, pp. 32-35.
79 This chapter does not refer to Zakat-benefits to the poor and needy as insufficient data on
them is available.
Financial situation of social security 
In 2004, approximately 19 per cent of Iraq’s GDP was spent on public social pro-
tection measures and the budget planned an increase in spending equivalent to
almost 22 per cent of GDP for 2005. 80 In both 2004 and 2005, most of the social
protection related resources were allocated to the public food distribution system
(approximately 93 per cent of all resources allocated to social protection in 2004
and 21 per cent of Government revenue in 2005). 81 In second place were pen-
sion payments, which constituted about 15 per cent of all resources allocated to
social protection in 2004, or an estimated 3.5 per cent of GDP, 82 and which,
under the 2005 budget, accounted for 5 per cent of GDP. 
Flat emergency payments accounted for an increasing part of expenditures from
2003 to 2004, when they represented 3.5 per cent of GDP, following a decision
by the Ministry of Finance to award higher payments to pensioners with longer
service and higher grades as from January 2004. The provision of the funds nec-
essary to the payments is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance,
through the Treasury account and with very small contributions from employers
and workers. 
Weaknesses of the existing social security provisions 
The operation and effectiveness of both social security schemes have been sig-
nificantly impaired in recent years, both in respect of the coverage and range of
benefits provided and of the collection and recording of contributions from
employers and insured workers.
One of the main areas of concern with the regular pension system consists of the
low rate of coverage of private sector workers – less than 3 per cent. The man-
agement of the social security system reports high levels of evasion from
employers, who allegedly under-report the number of employees to avoid enrol-
ment in the scheme. Also contributing to the low rate of coverage is the fact that
an important part of the labour force is underemployed, i.e. individuals in under-
registered jobs who report receiving an income (e.g. self-employed, casual or
seasonal workers, etc.). 
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80 According to a World Bank Report (“Social protection in transition: Labour policy, safety
nets and pensions”, op.cit.), “…this is a huge sum of money by any standards. By comparison,
OECD countries spend on average just under 14 per cent of their GDP on social protection, while
the Middle East and North Africa region averages less than 5 per cent of GDP.
81 The Republic of Iraq Government General Budget for 2005, Ministry of Finance, Budget
Directorate, December, 2004. According to a World Bank report of June 2005, the PDS “is the
largest public food programme operating in the world today (…) – absorbing approximately 21 per
cent of government revenue” (“Considering the Future of the Iraqi Public Distribution System”,
Economic and Social Development Unit, Middle East Department, World Bank, 2005, p. 3).
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“Social protection in transition: Labour policy, safety nets and pensions”, op.cit, p. 47.
According to a MOLSA report, 83 both social security schemes are indebted. With
regard to the private sector scheme, this is due, according to MOLSA, to a
number of factors. First, the high degree of non-compliance of private compa-
nies with the provisions of Law No. 39 of 1971 is believed to have contributed
to keeping the number of contributors to the scheme relatively low. In addition,
the possibility, under the scheme, for allowances to be deducted from the con-
tributor’s salary base before the contribution is calculated has also been identi-
fied as a factor for such a low level of participation. MOLSA further mentions
the fact that contributions owed by companies to the social security budget are
calculated on the basis of workers’ salary for the month of January instead of on
their monthly salary, as one of the causes of the scheme’s deficit. More gener-
ally, it is pointed out that the proper functioning of the scheme, which requires
the effective recovery of unpaid contributions from private companies, is still
hampered by institutional dysfunctions and the overall security problems that
affect the country. 84
It was also pointed out by MOLSA that the coexistence of the public and private
sector social insurance schemes became difficult after the war: the dual struc-
ture of the pension system was questioned for fostering inequalities between the
private and the public sector and for increasing administration costs, “preclud-
ing an efficient allocation of resources”. 85 Furthermore, the dual structure does
not consider any inter-sector transfer for people accumulating years of service
in both the State and private economy and thus horizontal labour migration from
public to the private sector has been small due to the lack of transferability of
pension rights between the two funds, impeding the development of the private
sector economy. 
In pre-conflict times, the administration of pension schemes was already faced
with problems, mainly relating to the “manual outdated administrative systems,
with poor record keeping and little accountability”. 86 The State pension system
faces similar problems due to the manual registration of contributors and con-
tributions and only partial computerization of beneficiaries. As all other public
institutions, social security institutions were severely affected by the war and
have suffered infrastructure deterioration post-war. 87
Emergency payments are an important tool in alleviating poverty in conflict sit-
uations when it is not possible to maintain formal social security schemes. The
eligibility conditions surrounding their payment are necessarily different to those
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“Social security for employed labour force in Iraq”, December 2005 (as distributed and
presented by representatives of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs at the ILO, Geneva, in
December 2005).
84 ibid, p. 5.
85 ibid. p. 50
86 Iraq’s National Development Strategy 2005-2007, op.cit, p. 2.
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“Social protection in transition: Labour policy, safety nets and pensions”, op.cit., p. 53.
of the pre-conflict formal social security schemes. In particular, levels of pay-
ments are in many cases less than an individual would have received from the
pension schemes. However, once Iraq moves from a conflict situation into a
stable political environment, it will be ready to consider the type of schemes that
would be appropriate in a new environment.
DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY STRATEGIES 
It is essential that plans for reconstruction and development include social secu-
rity in order to support employment generation, and that they are phased in in
a way that supports the overall reconstruction plan. The UN strategy recognizes
the long-term goal of providing employment and income-generating activities
across all sectors. It is proposed that focus should be directed on the restructur-
ing of the economy and on the most vulnerable through the provision of a social
safety net that provides a minimum income and access to basic health. Simul-
taneously, promoting social security coverage in all infrastructure works
through specific procurement regulations, and a gradual formalization of
employment in small enterprises provides an opportunity for social insurance
coverage to be expanded.
Within this broad strategic approach, there will be a need to reconstruct and
develop what remains of the national social security system. It is not possible,
at this time, to set out what a new system would look like, but it is possible to
mention the sort of issues that will need to be addressed. There needs to be a
comprehensive review of the existing schemes, social protection priorities,
resource prospects to finance social security, and the priority needs and gaps in
coverage for social protection.
The Government will have to decide the extent to which resources should be
channelled towards the reconstruction of the established pre-war social security
system and to what extent they are allocated to structural reform. The case of the
Iraqi pension system illustrates this issue. 
It is envisaged that a debate should be generated which should encourage con-
sideration and research as to the future development of a reconstructed national
social security system. The following paragraphs indicate some of the main
issues, which will need to be addressed in the reconstruction process.
Social security standards and legislation
The ILO has already provided technical assistance in the drafting of social secu-
rity legislation relating to both the public and private sector social security
schemes and has also drafted a Labour Code. Discussions on the final structure
of this legislation should be based on further discussion, including with employ-
ers’ and workers’ representatives, leading to relevant policy decisions. Legisla-
tion should be closely based on international labour standards but the initial
emphasis should be on the gradual reconstruction of the social security systems
underpinned by a basic level of income support and access to health care.
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Social security coverage
The extension of coverage under the social security schemes both in terms of the
range of protection and in the numbers of persons protected should be a key ele-
ment in the development of social security strategies. Gaps in social security
coverage are likely to remain significant for some time and this will include
many people who have become unemployed or who are working in the informal
economy. This may give rise to the need to consider the desirability of special
schemes for those in informal employment, the self-employed and also to con-
sider the feasibility of unemployment insurance or benefit. Among those in
employment, the social partners will play an important role in designing and
implementing new schemes and in modifying established schemes.
Social security financing
The financing of the proposed benefits must be thoroughly studied. A viable
solution can be found only through an overall analysis of the social budget,
which takes into account the fiscal capacity of the State as a whole. Social insur-
ance schemes, as one component of a national social protection system, can be
financed through a variety of methods and each of them can be justified on dif-
ferent grounds. However, they have to be part of an overall national social pro-
tection financing strategy. The social stability of the country will also, to a con-
siderable extent, depend on the rapid coverage of a major part of the population
under the new social security scheme. To achieve this, the possibility of intro-
ducing a universal basic pension scheme to be financed from general revenues
or an earmarked proportion of national oil revenues may be an option. Such a
scheme should function as a first tier of a national social security system. The
second tier could consist of the reformed existing insurance schemes.
Social security administration
The reconstruction of the administration of both the public and private sector
schemes, in terms of personnel, equipment and records will be a major task on
which the future effectiveness and public acceptability of the scheme will depend.
The establishment of the management and of a Board of Directors with tripartite
participation will be important. The State should have the overall responsibility
for the proper administration of the social security schemes and the due provi-
sion of benefits to be provided in compliance with the national legislation.
Clarification of responsibilities for management 
and administration of social security
Greater priority will need to be given to increasing the capacity and expertise of
the social security administration. This implies improvements in the working
conditions and in recruitment policies. The administration must consist of able
and experienced staff who know social security and who can assume responsi-
bility for its administration and for initiating and managing its reform and recon-
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struction. Social security is a national priority and the concept will help estab-
lish an understanding throughout the country of the need for mutual support. The
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs does not necessarily need to be directly
responsible for running the scheme. Its job should be to bridge the gap between
policy making and politics on the one hand and service and delivery on the other
Improvement of the policy building capacity
Many countries have chosen to recognize the need to strengthen the policy
making process and administration of their social security system through the
separation of functions between the legislative structure of the scheme and its
administration and implementation. The social security organization can thus
become an autonomous body responsible for running the scheme, with an inde-
pendent Board of Directors or Trustees who appoint a Managing Director to
administer the scheme and as appropriate other experts on administration, com-
puterization, finance, etc. Recruitment of personnel and their training will be a
high priority alongside the restoring of records for pensions contributions and
benefits payments. Account will need to be taken of the arrangements for the
efficient administration of the scheme and, in particular, for financial manage-
ment and control with regard to both long and short-term responsibilities.
Establishment of an effective computerized system
Iraq certainly needs a fully computerized records system since the records of
contributions and benefits paid represent the core of the social security system
and in particular one which is based on social insurance principles. The struc-
ture of the scheme will require both political and policy considerations and tech-
nical expertise. Bridging the gap between policy and administration is an impor-
tant role for the representatives of the beneficiaries and the contributors and the
politicians, so that their interests are taken care of, and accounted for, directly to
the Board. The investment of social security funds is thus an important element
in the financing of the scheme and it should be recognized that the return on each
investment should not be subordinated to political considerations. A special
investment committee should be established to ensure that sound decisions are
taken on investment management.
Special rules to facilitate entitlement to benefits
It will be important to ensure that adequate provisions are made to provide
appropriate benefits in accordance with the provisions and expectations of the
existing pre-war social security schemes. Many of those who are, or should be,
insured under the social insurance scheme may have gaps in their contribution
payment records that represent periods of employment or non-compliance by
their employer, or sickness, etc. In order to ensure adequate social protection for
persons with limited periods of membership in the scheme when it commences,
special arrangements should be made to modify the qualifying conditions for
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entitlement to benefit and the rate of benefit. This is particularly the case for
those who are close to retirement age.
Reform of the existing scheme has certain implications in that benefit rights
especially for pensions will have accrued and also liabilities to pay contributions
have not been met. In addition, persons insurable under the schemes have not
been insured and paid contributions and many employers have not paid contri-
butions. In other cases, insured persons will have joined the scheme late in life
so that they would be unable to qualify for a retirement pension, which usually
requires a qualifying period of at least 10 to 15 years. Special rules to assist such
persons in attaining a meaningful pension would be desirable.
The disruption of economic activity and the uncertainty of the situation have
obvious implications for income generating activities and for family support.
This is reflected in the effective coverage of both the private and the public
sector social security schemes. Special arrangements may also be made to pro-
vide income support, but a strategic approach to the continuation of these
schemes will need to be developed to assist gradually in their phasing out and
replacement by more effective and structured public systems. Nevertheless there
is likely to be a continuing role for private or religious schemes to provide sup-
port on a charitable basis to the most vulnerable and, in particular, to those who
are outside the scope of the national public schemes.
Need for policy initiatives and legislative reform
Special initiatives will need to be implemented from time to time, with particu-
lar reference to global programmes such as the extension of coverage and the
promotion of Decent Work. In addition, special plans will need to be made to
ensure impact on the objective. Examples are:
• Ensure income replacement for all employees and the self-employed for
contingencies such as: retirement, sickness, maternity, employment injury,
disability and the death of a breadwinner. This is most important for those
whose income is jeopardized or disrupted by inability to provide income
from employment.
• Provide income support for those without prospects of regular income from
employment. 
• Consideration of feasibility of introducing an unemployment insurance
scheme.
• Ensure access to adequate health care.
Rights to existing benefits earned during insured membership of the social secu-
rity scheme should be preserved. 
The future of social security in Iraq
The overall strategy envisaged for the development of social security in Iraq is
one which seeks to follow several tracks all of which lead to the same destina-
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tion – universal coverage. This means a series of reforms aimed both at the exist-
ing social security systems and at the benefit schemes themselves. The preced-
ing paragraphs have identified the main issues that will need to be addressed
once the reconstruction phase is reached. However, the nature of any reform will
be necessarily dependent on how long the existing situation continues.
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CHAPTER 7. EMPLOYMENT POLICIES 
AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORM
Defining and redefining the role of the State in the economy is one of the major
points of debate for economic policy in Iraq. As in many other countries of the
region, Iraq’s economy is dominated by the State. Government alone provides
employment to those who have work (See Table 2.7). There are some 192 State
-owned enterprises (SOE) in Iraq although exact information on the composi-
tion of their output or employment varies widely. In the latter case the estimates
range from 500,000 to 800,000 workers. 
Iraq drew up its vision in the National Development Strategy (2005) with its
focus on revitalizing the private sector and strengthening good governance and
improving the security situation. It is a formidable task to move away from a vir-
tually closed economy with enormous State intervention to a market-oriented
economy and many specific problems need to be overcome. However, in recent
years many States have made the transition from a closed, State-run economy to
a market economy. It is advisable to give due regard to the lessons that have been
learned in this transition process, when the pathway for Iraq’s reform process is
being laid out. The first steps of the reform process would inevitably lead to
some labour shedding. Careful consideration should be given to the sequencing
of reforms and the setting up of appropriate safety nets and social protection
measures as outlined in Chapter 6. The employment consequences of reform will
need to be considered in the wider context of tackling massive unemployment.
How the reform of the SOE in Iraq will affect the number of SOE workers and
their welfare will depend on the course and character of SOE reform. So far little
by way of a specific blueprint has emerged. Even the World Bank’s working
paper on SOE reform is almost exclusively concerned with the principles of
reform and the guidance derived from reform experience elsewhere rather than
an identification of reform policies specific to industries and enterprises in Iraq’s
public sector. 88 This chapter is also limited to outlining the broad pattern of SOE
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88 World Bank (Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure Department of Middle East and
North Africa Region). State Owned Enterprises Reform in Iraq, Reconstructing Iraq. Working
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reform that it considers both likely and desirable in Iraq and then spelling out its
implications for employment. This will be based upon an analysis of SOE and
their contribution to employment.
EMPLOYMENT IN STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
Table 7.1: Number of State-owned enterprises formerly affiliated 
with specific Line Ministries
Ministry/Commission Number of SOEs
Agriculture 10
Electricity 11
Finance 9
Health 1
Housing and Construction 15
Industry and Minerals (MIM) 48
Military Industrial Complex (MIC) 
(now with MIM) 48
Irrigation 11
Oil 19
Trade 8
Transport and Communication 12
Total 192
Source: World Bank (2004) 
There are 192 State-owned enterprises in Iraq and 43 enterprises with mixed
ownership covering all sectors and economic activities. Surveys of the status of
the SOE show that close to 90 per cent of Iraq’s industrial capacity “is seriously
de-capitalized, asset-starved, obsolescent, and inefficient, saddled with high pro-
duction costs, as a result of looting, over-staffed and in a state of physical degra-
dation” (World Bank, 2004). 89 These problems are not new, but were already
occurring during the sanctions period – largely as a result of the insufficient cap-
italization of assets and lack of access to input supply. However, events since
2003 have exacerbated this problem. One particular problem is the underuti-
lization of much of the staff: people continue to receive salaries even if they have
not enough work to do. 
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Paper No. 2, 26 July 2004, and similarly World Bank (Middle East and North Africa Region, Social
and Economic Development Group). Rebuilding Iraq, Economic Reform and Transition, 2006. 
89 ibid and DFID (2004), Iraq’s SOE Feasibility Studies. DFID, London, UK, Mimeo.
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Little information is available on employment in SOE in Iraq. One problem that
exacerbates the difficulty of coming up with an estimate of SOE employment is
the fuzzy line of demarcation between the SOE and the rest of public sector
employment, in particular public administration and defence. Before 2003 no
distinction was made between public administration and enterprises under super-
vision of line ministries that engaged in production activities. The only detailed
data available that give a detailed break-down of SOE is from 2004, but spe-
cialists have suggested that public sector employment was underreported given
the disincentive to report staffing levels adequately. If one abstracts from this
difficulty and assumes that public administration and defence strictly refer to the
categories that should belong to them, then an estimate would be close to
600,000 persons employed in SOE.90 This large number is partly due to rising
staff levels since the end of the war. According to some sources, SOE have
increased their staff by more than 30 per cent since the end of the 2003 war. If
the estimate of 600,000 workers is correct, then employment in SOE represents
close to 8 per cent of total employment and nearly 40 per cent of all public
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Table 7.2: Employment in State-owned enterprises: 2004
Sector/Ministry Employees Estimated Salary Expenses 2004 Average monthly salary, USD
USD, million ID, billion
Transportation 30,182 34.7 69.5 95.9
Communications 15,226 30.0 60.3 165.1
Trade 31,186 37.4 74.8 100.0
Water 6,665 9.3 18.6 116.3
Health 3,027 7.1 14.2 196.1
Housing 16,842 20.2 40.4 100.0
Culture 2,521 3.2 6.3 104.4
Agriculture 6,285 11.2 22.5 148.9
Oil 66,964 80.4 160.7 100.0
Electricity 40,000 48.0 96.0 100.0
Finance 9,608 11.7 23.4 101.6
MIM 104,378 186.1 372.3 148.6
MIC 55,913 58.0 116.0 86.4
Total 388,797 537.6 1075.1 115.2
Source: Ministry of Finance, General Budget Law FY05, January 2005
90 The draft budget of 2006 provides a number of 580,819 SOE workers as of mid-2006. The
growing number is also a reflection of the currently unstable environment. In view of the uncer-
tainties on the street, employment in SOE is often viewed as a last resort of stable and guaranteed
employment.
employment in Iraq. Thus employment in SOE represents a large share of the
State in production activities of the economy and it has risen since 2003. Indeed,
total employment in SOE is substantially larger than the entire employment in
all non-farm private enterprises excluding the micro enterprises which employ
four or fewer workers. 91 A major change in the level of SOE employment will
thus have a significant effect on aggregate employment in Iraq. 92
PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM
One important fact about Iraq’s SOE is that they represent State ownership far
beyond what experience around the developing world suggests being the limit
of meaningful public intervention. In Iraq, many industrial, agricultural and
service enterprises engaged in production activities are under State ownership
and control. Experience suggests, however, that State ownership and control
should best be limited to infrastructure and other select activities which are char-
acterized by large externalities. Elsewhere, especially in ordinary production
activities in industries, agriculture and services, governments would do much
better by leaving ownership and operation to the private sector while compen-
sating for any market failure by resorting to standard instruments of interven-
tion: taxes, subsidies and regulation. SOE reform in the long run should restruc-
ture the composition of ownership of enterprises in Iraq to fit this pattern.
This does not mean the immediate and straightforward privatization of the enter-
prises that do not meet the criteria of State ownership. There are many reasons
why this is not the case and why the following might be highlighted: at the
moment most SOE are either not operating or operating at far below capacity.
They are suffering from an acute shortage of investment and material inputs.
They also suffer from dislocated infrastructure and lack of security – conditions
which make the efficient functioning of a market economy impossible. Given
these circumstances, it is impossible to identify the market worth of individual
enterprises. Iraq’s industries were developed under distorted incentives, without
consideration of market or social profitability. It is likely that some of them
would still turn out to be socially profitable and some others could become so
after restructuring of their techniques and output composition. But it is equally
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91 According to the ILCS, private non-farm enterprises that employed more than four per-
sons each in manufacturing, construction, trade, education, health, and other services together
employed 0.640 million workers in 2004.
92 Note that the share of public employment is high, but substantially lower than in some of
Iraq’s neighbouring countries. In some countries of the region university graduates used to get guar-
antees for employment in the public sector. In Iraq, attempts to do the same were limited due to
rapid labour force growth and austerity measures introduced during its long-lasting economic crisis.
See: Karshenas, Massoud (1997): Macroeconomic Policies, Structural Change and Employment in
the Middle East and North Africa, in: Azizur Rahman Khan and M. Muqtada (eds.): Employment
expansion and macroeconomic stability under increasing globalization, ILO, Geneva. 
likely that some, probably many, would never achieve social or market prof-
itability. The problem is that the determination of the prospects of individual
enterprises is going to be very difficult, if not downright impossible, under the
present circumstances. On the demand side, Iraq’s domestic capital market is so
undeveloped, and the private sector so weak, that it would be exceedingly diffi-
cult to organize an orderly privatization. Even foreign private investors would
be extremely reluctant to enter into the market except into the politically-sensi-
tive oil sector. Opinion surveys have established extreme domestic hostility to
foreign investors. Given the fragile political situation, this must mean that pru-
dence would dictate the avoidance of privatization of existing enterprises by
handing them over to Western private foreign investors in the immediate future.
There is the further danger that a fire sale of unprofitable enterprises to private
investors will only lead to the misappropriation of assets by powerful bureau-
crats operating in the State sector and/or to misuse of assets. Immediate privati-
zation on a large scale is thus not an option.
A much better alternative for the Government is to try to put the enterprises back
into production based on social dialogue involving workers in the enterprises, in
order to achieve a reasonable level of capacity utilization by making the neces-
sary investment in replacing, modernizing and balancing the assets and by
improving access to inputs and markets. Quite apart from the absence of imme-
diate privatization as an alternative, this is an attractive option in that the oppor-
tunity cost of continuing to operate the SOE is likely to be relatively low on aver-
age. This is the case, because the only form of closure of a State enterprise that
is politically feasible is to pay very high termination benefits to the laid-off
workers. Wages are already low, partly, even largely, because of the huge con-
sumer subsidy in the form of the 100 per cent food ration provided to a large sec-
tion of the population. The marginal cost of operating the SOE may thus turn out
to be much lower than the observed average cost.
Once the SOE attain a decent level of performance, a strategy for their future
might be easier to formulate. In principle it would be desirable to classify them
into three categories. The first category would comprise all those enterprises
that are in infrastructure or similar activities with broad externalities. It would
make sense to keep them in the public sector. It might still not be desirable to
declare these sectors as public monopolies. Instead they should be opened up
for private investment in new enterprises so that there is a healthy competition
between the SOE and private enterprises. In the second category would belong
all those enterprises involved in ordinary manufacturing, agricultural and serv-
ice activities that turn out to be profitable or nearly profitable. These should be
privatized by a transparent system of transferring ownership. Finally, in the
third category would fall all those enterprises that are unlikely to meet the stan-
dard of social or market profitability. The continuation of these enterprises by
artificial support be it in the form of direct subsidies or a distorted system of
incentives, must be avoided.
It is worth emphasizing that the ultimate goal of a vibrant private sector, com-
plemented by a well-functioning role of the State, is best achieved by creating
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space for private enterprise to grow, not by the privatization of the existing SOE
(see Chapter 5). As the experience of China shows, rapid promotion of the pri-
vate sector is quite consistent with State ownership kept intact during transition
to a market economy. As the experience of the former Soviet Union shows,
wholesale privatization, without the creation of a healthy private sector and eco-
nomic institutions, leads to the collapse of existing State enterprises and creates
a highly unequal distribution of ownership of the privatized State enterprises
through the dominance of rent seeking by the bureaucrats in State enterprises
during the process of privatization.
An obvious question is: how can the SOE succeed in reviving themselves given
the current lack of security and disrupted infrastructure? A rhetorical response
is that the restoration of security by controlling insurgency and the rehabilita-
tion of the infrastructure by a proper organization of reconstruction are neces-
sary preconditions of any kind of economic revival. These preconditions must
be fulfilled to put Iraq on the path of sustained recovery, to be followed by
steady and rapid growth that the realization of the potential of this resource-rich
country warrants.
The essential validity of this argument can hardly be denied. And yet it does not
seem meaningful to argue that no avenue for recovery could be found until these
preconditions are fulfilled, if only because the end to the insurgency does not
appear to be on the horizon. What strategy for an employment-intensive recov-
ery of Iraq’s economy can be visualized in these circumstances? In the next
chapter we examine a few basic changes in Iraq’s current economic policy that
might help bring about such a change. 93
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sions are inextricably bound with important political decisions.
CHAPTER 8. TOWARDS A STRATEGY  
OF EMPLOYMENT-INTENSIVE RECOVERY 
AND DEVELOPMENT
A brief recapitulation of the employment scenario is useful at this stage. Iraq has
a very high level of unemployment of between 20 to 30 per cent, combined with
a very low “visible” underemployment rate of just over 3 per cent of the
employed workforce. While these figures indicate a certain degree of formal
access to the payroll, they are highly misleading as indicators of the degree of
productive use of available labour resources. In the formal economy, which has
a far higher share of the total economy in Iraq than in most developing countries
at a comparable level of living, the retention of labour on the payroll is not com-
mensurate with the low levels of production. Productively employed labour is a
much smaller proportion of labour resources than is indicated by the employ-
ment rates that are implied by the above unemployment and underemployment
rates. To increase the productivity of the formally employed workers and then
to reduce the observed rates of unemployment and underemployment, there must
be rapid recovery and growth of output. This must be the focus of economic and
employment policy in the short and medium term. Another unfavourable feature
of Iraq’s labour market is the extreme employment hostility of the overwhelm-
ingly dominant sector of the economy: oil contributes up to three quarters of
GDP but less than one-half of one per cent of employment. Iraq’s labour market
suffers from serious structural problems which will perpetuate an intolerably
high dependency ratio on the employed labour force even if all unemployment
and underemployment is eliminated.
Apart from insurgency, there are several identifiable obstacles to short-term
recovery and growth of which the most important are: a relatively ineffective
reconstruction programme in relation to the employment situation; and a serious
lack of incentive for non-oil traded sectors. It is widely reported that the rate of
implementation of the reconstruction programme has been slower than resource
availability would dictate, thereby preventing an early rehabilitation of the infra-
structure. Once again insurgency is blamed as a principal obstacle. Further-
more, as available reports and Chapter 3 suggest, reconstruction, largely imple-
mented by foreign contractors, is mostly focused on the import of equipment and
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supplies and very little on the use of Iraqi labour. It seems that to work around
insurgency, to improve the rate of utilization of resources, and to increase labour
intensity of investment, reconstruction needs to be indigenized, decentralized,
and depoliticized. Resources for reconstruction, domestic and foreign, should be
distributed to as low a level of local administration as possible with encourage-
ment for collaboration among the local administration, employers’ and workers’
representatives, civil society and the NGOs. Governorates, or some feasible
lower level, should be targeted. This automatically means that resources for
reconstruction will be under the control of the Iraqi local government although
the central government will still have an important coordinating role. This pre-
supposes a geographically balanced distribution of these resources, duly
weighted by population densities, irrespective of political differences. This will,
it is hoped, facilitate a more effective implementation of programmes and a rapid
utilization of resources in those large parts of Iraq where insurgency is limited
or under control: the Kurdish north and a good part of the Shiite south-east. Even
in the Sunni-dominated central and western parts an emerging civil society and
the NGOs at the grassroots level might be able to engage in reconstruction as
long as resources are effectively put at their disposal with the minimum of
strings attached. Even if the insurgency in this region continues, it might not be
directed against the popularly-managed non-political economic reconstruction
at the grassroots level. Along with the resources for reconstruction, the opera-
tion and management of the State-owned enterprises should also be decentral-
ized to the lowest feasible tier of the Government.
Even if the political problems of Iraq are overcome, there will remain an over-
whelming problem of disincentive that afflicts the non-oil tradable sectors of
Iraq’s economy. Currently only a quarter of GDP is reported to be produced by
all non-oil sectors. It appears that much of the non-oil economy consists of serv-
ices that are non-traded industries and agriculture – the traded and trade-substi-
tute sectors of the economy – produce very little. Quite apart from all the dislo-
cations preceding and following the wars, these activities appear to be afflicted
by a massive “Dutch disease” 94 of a kind. With oil revenues and reconstruction
funds flowing in, and easy de-facto access to imports, these industries face mas-
sive disincentives. They are in need of countervailing support without which
they simply cannot grow.
It might be argued that Iraq does not face a “Dutch disease”. With the third
largest oil reserve in the world, it makes sense to specialize in oil. As its reserve
gradually dwindles, the market will bring about a change in the incentive struc-
ture for the other industries to become profitable. This argument is flawed. Even
if Iraq’s oil reserves are inexhaustible, the outcome of the present strategy of the
preponderance of oil in the economy will mean a negligible overall output elas-
ticity of employment. Iraq will have to distribute its oil earnings among the pop-
ulation to operate an annuity-based economy leaving the labour force severely
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‘Dutch disease’ is an economic concept that tries to explain the seeming relationship
between the exploitation of natural resources and a decline in the manufacturing sector.
underutilized. There is no contemporary experience of a successful economy
operating on this basis. Furthermore, there are far too many uncertainties about
the volume of oil reserves and the optimum time pattern of its extraction in Iraq.
Sensible planning must provide for incentives for non-oil activities to grow.
The form that support to non-oil industries should take can only be worked out
after careful research of alternatives. There are some imperatives and priorities
that are however worth noting. The classical kind of import-substituting indus-
trialization, by the imposition of trade restrictions is unlikely to work due to its
well known inefficiencies and practical infeasibility in a globalizing world of
which Iraq rightly wants to be a part. Instead the policy makers must look for
some form of market-friendly method of promotion. One that appears particu-
larly attractive is to tie industrial promotion to employment: instituting some
form of employment subsidy, e.g. a negative payroll tax. This would increase
both profitability and employment of the targeted industries, thereby making
growth more employment intensive with the poverty-reducing and inequality-
averting consequences that it implies.
Financing of such a policy should not be difficult. Again the details can only be
worked out once the necessary information is collected to design such a policy.
But consider the following illustrative example: assume that half of all employed
workers would qualify for such a subsidy – almost certainly an overestimate –
and further assume that the monthly subsidy is US$20 per worker, which would
be a fairly high proportion of the average wage rate. The annual cost of such a
programme would be US$720 million. This is a small fraction of the cost of the
food ration subsidy and, as claimed by some reports, a fraction also of the sub-
sidy to petroleum users, a practice which is highly wasteful, encouraging smug-
gling out of petroleum. The wage subsidy could easily be financed by an orderly
reduction in some of these subsidies which will have its own benefits.
As discussed earlier, even if Iraq’s current labour force is fully and productively
employed, it will suffer from the crippling burden of every wage earner carry-
ing nearly three dependents. The dependency ratio must be lowered. One aspect
of the necessary change involves a demographic transition to a lower birth rate.
As Iraq emerges from its current transition, it must address this issue. Iran’s
experience shows that there is nothing in the culture and religion of a country
that necessarily prevents a rapid transition to low fertility. The other aspect of
required change, namely raising the participation rate of the working-age popu-
lation, will be helped once a restructuring of subsidies, away from consumption
into employment, takes place.
Towards a strategy of employment-intensive recovery and development
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